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MAY   <;/   1918 


THE  GERMAN  SOCIALISTS 

Do  They  Stand  for  a  Democratic  Peace? 

Will  They  Revolt? 


CONTENTS 

I.  The  Two  Socialist  Parties:    Kaiserists  and  Bolsheviki 

II.  The  German  Bolsheviki  and  Peace 

III.  German  Unity  Not  Yet  Seriously  Menaced 

IV.  Herr  Scheidemann,  President  Wilson,  and  the  German  Socialists 
V.  The  Anti-Democratic  Peace  Terms  of  the  Minority  Socialists 

VI.  The  Kaiser  and  the  Socialists 

VII.  President  Wilson  on  the  German  Government  and  the  German  People 


5>: ,  ^.  •■ 


The  articles  here  reproduced  were  pub- 
lished in  half  a  hundred  American  news- 
papers including  The  Times,  The  Tribune, 
and  The  Globe  of  New  York,  The  Ledger 
and  The  North  American  of  Philadelphia, 
The  Tribune  and  The  News  of  Chicago, 
The  Star  and  The  News  of  Indianapolis, 
The  Detroit  Free  Press,  The  Baltimore  Sun, 
The  Washington  Star,  and  others.  Two  were 
issued  to  the  press  by  the  Committee  of 
Public  Information,  and  several  by  The 
Alliance  for  Labor  and  Democracy.  It  will 
be  noted  that  they  are  almost  exclusively 
documentary. 

William  English  Walling,  Greenwich,  Conn. 
March  4,  1918. 


I.   The  Two  Socialist  Parties:  Kaiserists  and  German  Bolsheviki 

Reasons  Why  Democracy  Cannot  Trust  One  Any  More  Than  the  Other 


There  is  conclusive  evidence  that  we  are  at  war  and  must 
long  continue  at  war  against  the  German  people.  Over 
and  over  again  since  the  2d  of  April,  President  Wilson  has 
formulated  American  peace  terms.  Not  a  single  political 
party  speaking  hi  behalf  of  the  German  people  has  accepted 
any  of  the  President's  concrete  terms.  Everybody  knows  that 
the  avowedly  pro-Kaiser  SociaHsts,  led  by  Scheidemann  and 
the  Catholic  party  led  by  Erzberger  were  responsible  for 
the  peace  declaration  of  the  Reichstag,  which — since  was 
thoroughly  in  accord  with  the  other  "German  peace"  declar- 
ations of  the  other  branch  of  the  German  government.  There 
are  only  two  popular  political  groups  that  remain  to  be 
considered:  the  so-called  "minority"  Socialists,  under  the 
leadership  of  Haase,  and  the  so-called  "revolutionary" 
Socialists  under  the  leadership  of  Liebknecht. 

Both  these  "opposition"  Socialist  groups  are  in  thorough 
accord  with  all  those  points  of  the  Kaiser's  program  which 
President  Wilson  and  the  people  of  all  the  democratic 
nations  consider  vital. 

Haase,  Liebknecht,  and  their  followers  are  in  favor  of 
immediate  peace,  regardless  of  the  fact  that  the  Kaiser's 
situation  zvoiild  make  it  a  German  peace.  Both  accuse  Eng- 
land, France  and  America  of  "prolonging  the  war."  Both 
demand  a  German  solution  of  every  territorial  question.  As 
to  indemnities,  both  favor  making  England,  France  and 
America  pay  for  a  large  part  of  the  destruction  and  unneces- 
sary loss  of  life  caused  by  the  German  armies! 

Their  position  on  territorial  question  may  be  illustrated 
by  the  fact  that  they  both  disagree  with  the  President's 
demand  for  a  unified  and  independent  Poland,  with  acce.is 
to  the  sea,  and  insist,  instead,  that  German  and  Austrian 
Poland  shall  remain  German  and  Austrian — -regardless  of 
the  wishes  of  the  inhabitants.  This  they  do,  although  they 
demand  plebiscites  for  all  the  other  territories  for  which  the 
Entente  powers  are  demanding  self-government.  Of  course 
they  define  these  plebiscites  in  such  a  way  as  to  assure  a 
pro-German  majority  (which  would  be  impossible  in  the 
Polish  districts.)  One  more  illustration  will  suffice.  Both 
these  groups  believe  that  Armenia  should  be  returned  to 
Turkey!  The  pseudo-autonomy  demanded  would  be  of 
precious  little  value  after  the  Turks  had  completed  the  mas- 
sacre of  the  surviving  Armenians. 

Why  should  we  place  any  hope  in  so-called  democratic 
and  so-called  revolutionary  groups  which  agree  with  the 
peace  terms  of  the  Kaiser  and  disagree  with  the  peace  terms 
of  the  world's  great  democracies  as  formulated  by  Presi- 
dent Wilson? 

But  the  wish  is  father  to  the  thought.  A  great  many 
liberal  Americans  are  naturally  and  laudably  filled  with  the 
desire  to  welcome  any  genuine  democratic  movement  in 
Germany,  in  the  hope  that  such  a  movement  might  aid  in 
bringing  about  a  democratic  peace.  Hence  we  find  in  all 
directions  Americans  who  believe  that  there  must  appear 
shortly  some  large  and  powerful  element  among  the  Ger- 
man people  which  will  demand  a  just  and  democratic  peace. 
We  may  admit  that  military  defeats  may  ultimately  lead 
to  the  formation  of  such  a  group,  but  there  is  absolutely 
no  sign  whatever  that  such  a  group  is  even  in  process  of 
formation  at  present,  nor  have  we  any  indication  that  such 
a  group  is  likely  to  form  in  the  near  future. 


The  So-Called  "Opposition"  Socialists 

Haase  and  Ledebour,  the  leaders  of  the  "minority"  Socia. 
ists,  both  demanded  in  the  Reichstag  a  separate  peace  with 
Russia,  though  there  is  no  question  whatever  that  they 
knew  as  well  as  we  did  what  such  a  separate  peace  muse 
mean.  Their  position  on  this  matter  is  identical  with  that 
of  Lenine.  Troelstra  the  Dutch  Socialist  leader,  who  organ- 
ized the  notorious  Stockholm  peace  conference  (after  con- 
sultation with  Zimmerman,  head  of  the  German  Foreign 
Office,  who  tried  to  organize  the  Mexican  Japanese  com- 
bination against  America)  has  expressed  the  German  "min- 
ority" position  as  follows :  "A  separate  peace  may  pos- 
sibly be  the  only  means  to  get  a  general  peace."  Of  course 
this  means  all  the  evils  we  expect  from  an  impending  sep- 
arate peace  with  Russia  plus  the  far  greater  evil  of  using  it 
as  a  club  to  try  to  force  a  German  peace  not  only  upon  Rus- 
sia but  in  all  other  directions.  The  minority  Socialists  of 
Germany,  like  the  Bolsheviki  of  Russia,  do  not  favor  a  mere 
separate  peace ;  they  favor  something  infinitely  worse — 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  great  democracies  of  the  West. 

Minority's   Leanings   Toward   Kaiser   Clearly   Revealed 

The  general  public  has  been  greatly  misled  by  the  fact  that 
Ledebour,  the  minority  leader,  last  Spring  uttered  the 
word  "republic"  in  the  Reichstag.  The  American  public 
does  not  know  that  probably  not  a  year  has  passed  in  the 
last  generation  when  such  purely  verbal  attacks  on  Kaiser- 
ism  were  not  heard  on  the  Reichstag  floor.  Revolutionary 
words  accompanied  by  absolutely  loyal  deeds  have  been 
the  fundamental  characteristic  of  the  German  Socialism. 
These  "republican"  talks  have  been  so  often  repeated  in 
Germany  that  they  do  not  create  a  ripple  in  that  country, 
yet  they  are  noised  abroad  by  German  agents  and  German 
sympathizers  to  gain  support  for  an  imaginary  revolutionary 
movement  in  Germany,  which  has  no  real  existence. 

The  true  character  of  the  minority  Socialists  is  shown  by 
the  fact  that  they  were  fully  aware  of  the  Kaiser's  support 
of  the  Stockholm  conference  and  did  not  deny  it.  This 
conference  was  not  only  initiated  with  the  consent  of  Zim- 
merman but  it  was  openly  endorsed  by  the  Hungarian,  Bul- 
garian and  Turkish  governments,  and  at  a  later  stage  also 
by  the  government  of  Austria.  To  refer  to  a  party  thus 
co-operating  with  the  war  aims  or  so-called  peace  aims  of 
the  Teutonic  governments  as  an  "opposition"  party  is  cerr 
tainly  absurd. 

There  remains  to  be  considered  the  so-called  revolution- 
ary group  of  Liebknecht.  This  group  is  as  conservative  in 
questions  touching  the  war  as  it  is  revolutionary  in  home 
affairs.  Undoubtedly  it  would  overthrow  the  Kaiser;  but 
it  would  change  the  Kaiser's  peace  policy  in  no  essential 
particular  whatever.  For  the  essential  point  is  that  both 
the  Kaiser  and  Liebknecht  demand  immediate  peace  "re- 
gardless of  the  stragetic  situation,"  that  is  a  peace  based 
upon  negotiations,  with  the  pretense  that  the  German  gov- 
ernment will  ignore  the  war  map.  ■ 

The  American  people  should  have  no  difficulty  in  under- 
standing the  zuar  policy  of  Liebknecht;  it  is  identical  with 
that  of  Lenine. 


373757 


In  order  to  see  the  identity,  it  is  only  necessary  to  com- 
pare a  few  of  their  leading  statements.  One  of  Lenine's 
chief  statements  about  the  war  is  as  follows :  "The  present 
war  on  the  part  of  all  the  belligerents,  is  an  imperialistic 
war,  that  is,  it  is  fought  by  capitalists  for  the  division  of 
spoils  through  their  domination  of  the  world,  for  markets, 
for  financial  capital,  for  the  suppression  of  the  backward 
nations,"  etc.  Later  in  the  summer  Lenine  reaffirmed  this 
statement  in  still  stronger  language.  "If  we  are  opposed 
to  the  prolongation  of  the  present  war,  it  is  because  it  is 
being  waged  by  two  groups  of  Powers  for  purely  imper- 
ialistic purposes.  It  is  waged  by  capitalists  anxious  to 
increase  their  profits  by  extending  their  domination  over 
the  world,  conquering  new  markets  and  subjugating  small 
nations.  I  cannot  protest  too  energetically  against  the  slan- 
derous statements  spread  by  capitalists,  against  the  Bolshe- 
viki  party,  to  the  effect  that  we  are  in  favor  of  a  separate 
peace  with  Germany.  To  us  the  capitalists  of  Germany 
(i.  e.,  the  government)  are  plain  pirates,  like  the  capitalists 
(i.  e.,  the  governments)  of  Russia,  England  and  France." 
We  have  all  seen  the  queer  meaning  given  by  Lenine  to 
his  supposed  opposition  to  a  separate  peace.  It  means  that 
he  wishes  to  force  not  only  Russia  but  all  other  nations  to 
consent  to  his  peace  program — after  securing  the  approval 
of  the  Kaiser ! 

Lenine  draws  no  distinction  whatever  between  the  auto- 
cratic and  the  democratic  governments  of  the  world.  We 
have  seen  what  the  Bolsheviki  have  done  in  Russia  and  the 
effect  they  have  had  on  the  world. 

Shall  we  now  place  our  hopes  in  Karl  Liebknecht  who 
stands  for  exactly  the  same  program  ?  Not  only  is  his  pro- 
gram the  same,  but  Lenine  and  Liebknecht  have  been  co- 
operating in  the  celebrated  Zimmerwald  "peace  at  any 
price"  movement  from  the  very  first  days  of  the  war. 

The  foundation  of  this  movement  is  the  position  that 
there  is  just  as  much  need  for  revolutions  in  America, 
France  and  Italy  as  in  Germany  and  that  there  need  be  no 
German  upheaval  until  these  other  governments  have  been 
overthrown.  Of  course,  this  is  equivalent  to  saying  that 
German  military  victories  are  not  to  be  counterbalanced  bv 
a  German  revolution. 


Ask  No  Revolution  to  Mar  German  Victory 

Here  we  have  the  expressed  declaration  and  pledge  of 
the  most  revolutionary  group  in  Germany,  that  there  shall 
be  no  German  revolution  to  interfere  with  Germany's  reap- 
ing of  the  harvest  of  her  victories.  Shall  we  then  be  so  blind 
as  to  continue  to  rely  upon  the  hope  that  such  "revolution- 
ists will  aid  us  to  overthrow  Kaiserism  in  the  war?" 

Liebknecht  has  clearly  and  repeatedly  expressed  himself 
since  the  war.  "This  war,  which  none  of  the  peoples  in- 
terested wanted,  was  not  declared  in  the  interests  of  the 
Germans  or  of  any  other  people.  It  is  an  imperiahst  war 
for  capitalization  and  domination  of  the  world  markets,  for 
political  domination  of  important  quarters  of  the  globe,  and 
for  the  benefit  of  bankers  and  manufacturers."  In  the  fol- 
lowing lines  we  have  definitely  repeated  the  proposition  that 
no  revolution  is  likely  to  weaken  the  German  armies  until 
the  armies  of  the  enemy  have  been  equally  weakened  in 
advance.  "The  situation  for  action  would  become  ripe  im- 
mediately if  we  had  the  certainty  that  our  comrades  in 
France,  Britain,  Belgium,  etc.,  would  make  common  cause 
with  us  against  the  war.  Therefore,  dear  comrade,  do  help 
us  to  make  an  end  to  this  murderous  war  (before  still  other 
countries  join.)"  The  Liebknecht  conception  of  peace  is 
precisely  the  same  as  that  of  the  Kaiser  in  the  essentia! 
point,  namely,  that  there  is  no  reason  why  peace  should  not 
be  based  on  German  military  victories.  "It  is  said  that 
propaganda  for  peace  would  be  interpreted  as  3  sign  of 


weakness.  Against  that  we  say:  Wrong  interpretations 
are  thwarted  by  hard  facts.  And  the  incontestable  fact  is 
the  favorable  military  position  of  Germany.  The  frontiers 
are  secure,  and  the  war  is  being  carried  on  on  the  enemy's 
ground.  It  is  for  this  very  reason  that  we  can  be  the  first 
to  proclaim  the  word,  'Peace !'  "  In  the  same  document  in 
which  this  statement  was  made  Liebknecht  and  his  party 
issued  the  cry  of  the  Bolsheviki  and  the  notorious  Stock- 
holm conference  against  annexations,  demanding  "political 
and  economic  independence"  not  for  all  people  but  only  for 
all  nations. 

"Revolutionary"  Principles  Don't  Apply  Against  Kaiser 

That  the  Bolsheviki  anti-Entente  feeling  is  universal 
among  the  Zimmerwald  Socialists  of  all  nations,  including 
the  Germans,  is  shown  on  many  questions.  For  example, 
the  octogenarian  German  Swiss  leader,  Greulich,  was  shown 
to  have  carried  100,000  francs  to  Mayor  Nathan  of  Rome 
to  promote  a  German  propaganda.  Another  German  Swiss 
leader,  Grimm,  was  the  cause  of  the  dismissal  by  Switzer 
land  of  the  head  of  the  Swiss  foreign  department  (Hoff- 
man) because  of  their  efforts  to  favor  a  German  peace  in 
Russia. 

The  very  fact  that  a  separate  peace  negotiation  between 
the  Russian  revolutionists  and  the  Kaiser  is  favored  by  the 
Zimmerwaldists  in  all  countries  shows  that  they  do  not 
apply  their  "revolutionary"  principles  against  the  Kaiser's 
peace  policies.  In  what  part  these  negotiations  are  due 
to  an  acceptance  of  Kaiserism  (at  least  in  its  war  and  peace 
aspects)  and  in  what  part  to  the  acceptance  of  the  founda- 
tion teaching  of  Kaiserism,  namely,  that  the  Prussian  mili- 
tary system  cannot  be  defeated  in  war,  is  a  matter  of  sec- 
ondary moment. 

The  Swedish  Socialists  are  far  from'  being  in  any  sense 
anti-German.  Yet  a  cable  dispatch  quotes  the  Stockholm 
Social  Demokraten  as  folloz^'s:  "It  is  a  question  of  a  sep- 
arate peace,  with  every  possibility  of  an  imperialistic  peace, 
at  Russia's  cost  first  of  all  and  then  at  the  cost  of  the  whole 
western  democracy." 

The  Social  Demokraten  further  divulges  the  fact  that 
a  notorious  German  agent  the  Socialist,  Parvus,  has  been 
used  by  the  Bolsheviki  as  an  intermediary. 

Possibly  the  Russian  revolution  had  at  one  time  some 
chance  of  having  effect  in  Germany  but  only  in  the  earliest 
stages  of  the  revolution.  At  that  time  it  looked  as  though 
a  new  and  powerful  democratic  government  was  about  to 
be  erected,  a  government  which  would  advance  the  interests 
of  the  Russian  people  at  home  and  protect  them  abroad.  The 
miserable  collapse  of  all  the  constructive  elements  in  Rus- 
sia and  the  surrender  to  Kaiserism  have  brought  the  Bol- 
sheviki into  the  merited  contempt  of  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  the  German  people. 

Bolsheviki  Strengthens  Kaiser's  Supporters 

Not  only  have  we  no  present  ground  to  expect  any  move- 
ment among  the  German  people  for  a  genuinely  democratic 
peace,  but  any  tendencies  which  may  have  existed  in  that 
direction  have  been  all  but  annihilated  by  the  Russian  col- 
lapse. This  situation  has  been  well  stated  by  a  leading 
member  of  the  American  Socialist  party,  a  radical  pacifist 
who  cannot  be  suspected  of  any  prejudice  either  against  the 
Lenine  or  the  Liebknecht  parties.  This  American  leader, 
Louis  Boudin,  who  is  known  as  the  leading  Marxian  writer 
in  this  country,  has  stated  this  deplorable  effect  of  the  Rus- 
sian revolution  in  Germany  as  follows : 

"The  Russian  Revolution  has  run  into  such  excesses  that 
Scheidemann  instead  of  being  compelled  to  take  note  of  it 
by  way  of  paying  tribute  to  it  and  making  a  pretense  of 
emulating  it  in  some- degree  at    least,    is    now   enabled   to 


openly  point  a  finger  of  condemnation  and  warning  against 
it.  Instead  of  being  compelled  by  the  Russian  Revolution 
to  assume  a  semi-rebellious  attitude  towards  the  German 
government,  Scheidemann  can  now  lecture  the  German 
working  class  on  the  dangers  of  revolution  in  the  midst  of 
war  and  pride  himself  on  the  fact  that  he  had  by  his  leader- 
ship kept  the  German  working  class  from  the  pitiful 
rtate  into  which  the  Russian  working  class  has  fallen  by 
following  the  extremists." 

Nothing  could  so  aid  the  German  peace  propaganda  to- 
day as  a  belief  that  with  further  concessions,  and  further 
concessions  and  further  concessions,  it  might  be  possible  to 
win  the  German  people  to  a  democratic  ]>eace  without  fur- 
ther military  defeats.  The  fact  is  that  the  German  people 
have  not  accepted  a  single  one  of  the  peace  principles  of 
the  great  western  democracies,  and  show  less  tendency  to 
do  so  to-day  than  before  the  Russian  Revolution  led  them 
to  believe  that  they  must  still  obtain  a  German  peace. 

Not  only  is  there  no  present  evidence  of  a  tendency 
within  Germany  to  accept  a  peace  based  upon  democratic 
principles,  but  all  the  German  parties,  are  aiding  the  propa- 
ganda in  America,  Russia  and  all  other  countries  of  vari- 
ous German  ideas  of  peace  which  have  nothing  in  common 
with  democratic  principles,  while  resisting  by  all  means  in 
their  power  the  effort  of  democratic  nations,  under  the 
leadership  of  President  Wilson,  to  secure  support  inside  of 
Germany  for  genuinely  democratic  peace  ideas. 

Yet  peace  can  come  before  the  decisive  defeat  of  the  Ger- 
man armies  only  if  the  invasion  of  free  nations  by  the  peace 
ideas  of  Germany  is  checked  and  the  peace  ideas  of  free 
nations  take  possession  of  Germany.  If  the  German  people 
continue  impervious  to  the  rights  of  other  peoples  and  to 
their  demand  for  a. peace  based  on  the  durable  foundations 
of  equality,  justice  and  democracy,  then  the  war  will  con- 
tinue— as  President  Wilson  says  in  his  December  message 
— until  the  German  military  power  is  "crushed  and  utterly 
brought  to  an  end" — which  means  incalculable  suffering  and 
loss  of  life  to  the  German  people. 

"Opposition"  Socialists  Favor  German  Peace 

In  its  manifesto  of  greeting  to  the  Bolsheviki  revolution, 
the  German  "opposition"  Socialists  leave  no  doubt  that  this 
section  of  the  German  people — from  whom  alone  we  had 
hoped  for  democratic  peace  ideas — is,  on  the  contrary, 
entirely  devoted  to  the  Bolsheviki  anti-Entente  peace  policv. 
This  manifesto  refers  to  the  Bolsheviki  as  "the  proletariat," 
ignoring  the  fact  that  the  Socialist  Revolutionist  led  by  Ker- 
ensky  and  Tcherneff  have  elected  two-thirds  of  the  Consti- 


tutional Assembly.  It  then  proceeds  to  endorse  the  Bolshe- 
viki denunciation  of  "all  the  imperialist  governments" — thu? 
making  the  Kaiserism  identical  with  the  democratic  repub- 
lics of  America  and  France ! 

Shall  we  continue  to  look  for  support  from  such  ele- 
ments? Shall  we  not  rather  expect  from  them  the  vitrolic 
and  treacherous  antagonism  of  Trotsky  and  Lenine,  no  whit 
less  violent  than  that  of  Hindenburg  and  the  Kaiser? 

Postcript — The    View   of   Another    German    Bolsheviki 

Leader 

Rosa  Luxemberg  is  almost  as  well  known  a  leader  of  the 
German  "revolutionists"  as  Karl  Liebknecht.  She  is  also 
in  prison.  The  extract  quoted  below,  written  since 
America's  entrance  into  the  war,  shows  that,  like  the  Rus- 
sian Bolsheviki,  she  still  accuses  the  Entente  of  being  as 
great  an  imperialist  menace  as  Germany. 

"A  German  victory  would  be  the  prelude  to  an  early 
second  world-war,  and  therefore,  for  this  reason,  the  sig- 
nal for  new  feverish  armaments,  for  the  unleashing  of  the 
blackest  reaction  in  every  country,  but  particularly  in  Ger- 
many. On  the  other  hand  a  victory  of  England  or  France 
would  mean,  in  all  likelihood,  for  Germany  the  loss  of  a 
part  of  her  colonies,  as  well  as  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  cer- 
tainly the  bankruptcy  of  the  world-political  position  of  Ger- 
man militarism.  But  this  would  mean  the  disintegration  of 
Austria-Hungary  and  the  total  liquidation  of  Turkey.  Re- 
actionary as  both  of  these  states  are,  and  much  as  their  dis- 
integration would  be  in  line  with  the  demands  of  progressive 
development,  in  the  present  world  political  milieu,  the  dis- 
integration of  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy  and  the  liquidation 
of  Turkey  would  mean  the  bartering  of  the  peoples  to  the 
highest  bidder — Russia,  England,  France,  or  Italy.  This 
enormous  redivision  of  the  world  and  shifting  of  the  bal- 
ance of  power  in  the  Balkan  States  and  along  the  Mediter- 
ranean would  be  followed  inevitably  by  another  in  Asia, 
the  liquidation  of  Persia  and  a  redivision  of  China.  This 
would  bring  the  English-Japanese  conflict  into  the  fore- 
ground of  international  politics,  and  may  bring,  in  direct 
connection  with  the  liquidation  of  the  present  war,  a  new 
world  war,  perhaps  for  Constantinople,  would  certainlv 
bring  it,  unescapably,  in  the  immediate  future.  So  a  vic- 
tory on  this  side,  too,  would  lead  to  new,  feverish  arma- 
ments in  all  nations — the  defeated  Germany,  of  course,  at 
the  head — and  would  introduce  an  era  of  undivided  rule  for 
militarism — and  reaction  all  over  Europe,  with  a  new  war  as 
its  final  goal." 


II.     The  German  Bolsheviki  and  Peace 

What  Hope  for  a  Just  Settlement  in  the  Minority  Socialists  of  Germany  and  Austria? 


The  United  States  Government's  Committee  on  Public 
Information  has  issued  cabled  reports  of  the  reception  of 
President  Wilson's  peace  message  of  February  11.  Some 
of  these  are  extremely  significant.  They  show  that  the  lead- 
ing parties  of  Germany,  including  the  pro-war  Socialists, 
make  the  following  deductions  from  the  Presidential  mes- 
sage: 

That  the  President  accepts  the  Reichstag  resolution 
of  July  19; 

That  the  President  knows  the  Reichstag  resolution 
was  tacitly  accepted  at  that  time  by  the  German  Gov- 
ernment ; 

That  the  President  does  not  have  the  support  of  the 
Entente  in  this  position. 


The  Reichstag  resolution  of  July  19  formulated  that  va- 
riety of  German  peace  which  rests  upon  the  restoration  of 
the  territorial  status  quo  ante  and  the  non-payment  by  Ger- 
many for  the  work  of  destruction  done  by  her  armies.  This 
was  the  peace  denounced  by  the  President  on  May  26,  June 
14,  November  13  and  December  4.  Moreover,  his  peace 
terms  formulation  of  January  8  were  directed  precisely  as 
much  at  this  form  of  German  peace  as  at  the  other  form 
that  aims  at  open  annexations.  The  President  said  on  Jan- 
uary 8,  for  example,  that  a  democratic  peace  would  require 
both  political  and  economic  independence  for  Poland  and 
the  Balkan  States.  And  even  in  the  message  of  February 
11  Mr.  Wilson  again  refers  to  the  necessity  that  the  new 
Poland  shall  include    all    "indisputably    Polish"    districts. 


which  means  what  all  German  parties  call  "a  violation  of 
the  territorial  integrity"  of  Germany  and  Austria.  In  the 
message  of  January  8  Mr.  Wilson  applies  this  same  prin- 
ciple to  Italian  Austria. 

If  the  President  refers  favorably  to  the  Reichs.- 
tag  resolution  of  July  19,  he  does  so  only  to  con- 
trast it  with  the  avowed  annexationist  plans  of  the  German 
Junkers  and  to  indorse  its  repudiation  of  annexations  and 
war  indemnities,  (i.  e.,  payments  of  war  expenses.)  The 
President,  however,  proceeds  to  his  own  formulation  of  the 
third  feature  of  the  "no  annexations,  no  indemnities" 
formula,  namely,  the  demand  for  "the  self-determination  of 
nationalities,"  a  feature  commonly  suppressed  by  the  Ger- 
mans and  pro-German  Socialists,  but  revived  by  the  Bolshe- 
viki.  Mr.  Wilson  emphasizes  our  point  of  agreement  with 
the  Reichstag  resolution,  namely,  that  we  oppose  annexa- 
tions. He  proceeds  to  show  that  he  means  only  annexations 
against  the  will  of  the  inhabitants.  But  he  does  not  point 
out  that  the  Reichstag  resolution  clearly  denounces  even 
such  territorial  changes  and  was  intended  to  do  so.  By  "no 
indemnities"  the  Reichstag  resolution  clearly  denounces  all 
claims  against  Germany  for  restoration  of  territories  she 
has  deliberately  laid  waste.  The  President  has  now  merely 
stated  that  we  are  ready  to  listen  if  there  are  any  just  rea- 
sons why  such  damages  should  not  be  paid. 

It  is  clear  from  the  wording  of  the  Reichstag  resolution 
that  Germany  would  regard  the  loss  of  any  of  the  "terri- 
torial possessions"  of  herself  or  of  "her  allies"  as  conquests. 
That  is  to  say,  the  Reichstag  resolution  does  not  permit  of 
the  discussion  of  the  questions  of  German  and  Austrian 
Poland,  Alsace-Lorraine,  Italian  Austria,  or  the  fate  of  any 
of  the  subject  nationalities  oppressed  and  massacred  by  the 
Turks. 

In  an  article,  (reprinted  in  The  Mail  of  January  8,)  Pro- 
fessor von  Schulze-Gaevemitz,  one  of  the  most  famous  of 
the  Progressive  leaders,  explains  at  great  length  the  pur- 
pose of  the  Reichstag  resolution.  The  impression  the  Presi- 
dent has  made  on  these  "liberals"  is  well  shown  by  the 
Professor's  matter  of  fact  remark  that  "President  Wilson 
has  expressly  shaken  off  the  claim  of  France  to  Alsace-Lor- 
raine." We  read  also  that  "the  ultimate  reasons  which 
determined  the  Reichstag  majority  resolution  cannot  be 
made  public."  Clearly  this  is  a  secret  diplomacy  and  the 
motives  were  such  that  they  would  be  defeated  if  the  En- 
tente knew  them.  Evidently  part  of  the  intrigue  is  to  get 
President  Wilson's  favor  and  to  separate  him  from  the  En- 
tente. A  similar  object,  the  Professor  makes  equally  plain, 
is  to  create  pacifist  insurrections  in  England,  France,  and 
Italy.    As  Schulze-Gaevernitz  said: 

Since  July  19  the  English  and  French  workingmen 
have  declared  themselves  against  their  Government's 
policy  and  in  favor  of  reconciliation  and  negotiation. 
The  Italian  Socialists  threateningly  demand  peace. 
These  things  represent  no  small  successes  for  the  step 
the  Reichstag  took. 

At  the  time  of  the  German  strikes  in  January  the  pro- 
gressive leaders  again  expressed  the  hope  that  they  might 
lead  to  strikes  against  the  war  in  the  Entente  countries. 

Schulze-Gaevernitz  also  explains  that  the  Reichstag  reso- 
lution "served  to  keep  quiet  the  Social  Democrats  and  the 
Austrians."  But  this  did  not  involve  any  expressed  or  un- 
expressed concession  to  the  Entente.  On  the  contrary,  he 
points  out  that  the  resolution  received  "the  expressed  ap- 
proval of  the  Imperial  Government  and  the  highest  military 
authorities,"  that  is,  it  was  approved  by  the  Kaiser,  Hin- 
denburg,  and  Ludendorff !  And  now  the  claim  is  made,  not 
only  in  Germany,  but  in  England  and  America,  that  the  reso- 
lution is  indorsed  by  President  Wilson.    The  German  claim 


may  be  dishonest.  The  other  is  due  either  to  fanaticism  or 
to  an  equally  dangerous  recklessness  of  statement. 

We  have  seen  the  object  of  the  progressives  in  support- 
ing the  Reichstag  resolution.  The  speeches  made  by  Erz- 
berger,  the  Catholic  leader,  after  he  had  succeeded  in  put- 
ting the  resolution  through,  show  that  his  aim  was  the  same. 
What  now  were  the  objects  of  the  Socialists? 

To  explain  the  objects  of  the  majority  Socialists  in  sup- 
porting the  Reichstag  resolution  and  of  the  minority  Social- 
ists in  criticising  it  is  the  quickest  and  clearest  possible  way 
of  grasping  both  the  position  of  the  German  "liberals"  and 
that  of  the  Socialists  themselves.  When  we  have  under- 
stood the  Socialists'  motives  on  this  critical  question  we  are 
in  a  position  to  see  what  hope  there  is  at  present  either  of  a 
revolution  or  of  peaceful  democratization  in  Germany. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  dwell  at  length  on  the  position  of 
the  pro-Government  Socialists,  the  so-called  majority  fac- 
tion led  by  Scheidemann.  This  faction  supports  the  Reichs- 
tag resolution  and  the  peace  terms  of  the  Central  Europe 
party;  the  military  and  economic  dependence  of  all  sur- 
rounding territories  upon  Germany — whether  such  terri- 
tories consist  of  weakened  members  of  the  Entente,  of  Ger- 
man's own  allies,  of  the  defenseless  little  States  she  is  aim- 
ing to  set  up  to  the  south  and  east,  or  of  the  present  smaller 
neutrals  already  in  terror  of  her  economic  and  military 
power.  The  New  Yorker  Volkszeitung,  a  Socialist  paper 
supporting  the  minority,  thus  sums  up  the  position  of  the 
majority:  "The  German  majority  Socialists  and  the  labor 
unions  connected  with  it  under  the  leadership  of  Legien  {i. 
e.,  nearly  all  the  unions)  have  developed  in  the  last  three 
and  one-half  years  into  conscious  tools  of  the  ruling  classes." 

Before  taking  up  the  German  minority  it  is  well  to  state 
the  position  of  the  Austrian  Socialists  (the  German  Ausr 
trians).  For  if  there  is  any  revolution  among  the  Central 
Powers  it  will  almost  certainly  break  out  in  Austria.  In 
the  party  convention  in  Vienna  on  October  25  a  resolution 
demanded  that  Serbia,  Roumania,  and  Poland  "should  not 
be  held  in  any  form  of  military  or  economic  dependence.'' 
After  the  Bolshevist  revolution  in  November  this  same  reso- 
lution was  repeated  in  mass  meetings  held  in  Vienna.  Here 
is  an  extremely  important  theoretical  departure  from  the 
position  of  the  Central  European  party.  However,  it  is 
purely  theoretical.  Germany  has  reduced  her  neighbor."?  in 
all  directions  to  a  position  of  relative  helplessness.  If  the 
war  is  ended  to-day  merely  by  the  withdrawal  of  her  armies 
to  German  borders  all  her  neighbors  would  be  dependent 
both  in  an  economic  and  in  a  military  sense.  Belgium, 
France  and  Italy  would  be  defenseless  from  a  military  point 
of  view  as  soon  as  the  British  and  American  armies  retired, 
and  so  seriously  weakened  economically  as  to  make  any 
German  overtures  for  the  resumption  of  economic  relations 
exceedingly  tempting — even  though  Germany  should  secure 
the  larger  share  of  the  profit  of  the  new  treaties  and  resume 
her  threatening  economic  development  at  their  expense — 
doubly  threatening  in  view  of  their  weakened  condition. 
The  situation  of  all  Germany's  smaller  and  weaker  neigh- 
bors, whether  enemies,  allies,  or  neutrals,  would  be  still 
worse  than  that  of  France  and  Italy. 

The  Austrian  Socialists,  however,  have  recognized  the 
chief  danger  to  Poland,  Serbia,  Roumania  and  all  other 
small  and  weak  neighbors  of  Germany — not  political  de- 
pendence, but  economic  and  military  dependence.  But 
economic  and  military  dependence  is  a  question  not  of 
treaties,  but  of  fact.  Germany  is  to-day  dominant  on  the 
continent  of  Europe  by  virtue  of  her  victories  even  if  she 
withdraws  to  her  previous  frontiers.  No  political  annexa- 
tions are  necessary  to  carry  this  domination  into  practical 
effect. 

The  German  minority  Socialists,  the  party  of  Haase, 
Kautsky,  and  Bernstein,  also  recognizes  this  situation,  and 


is  equally  helpless  to  deal  with  it.  But  may  not  this  German 
minority,  aided  by  the  Austrian  minority,  gain  power 
through  a  revolution,  and  may  it  not  then  evolve  some  ef- 
fective way  to  prevent  the  German  domination  of  Europe? 
What,  in  the  first  place,  is  their  attitude  toward  revolution  ? 

Bernstein  held  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  that  no  revo- 
lution was  to  be  expected  in  Germany.  Again  at  the  end 
of  1916  he  expressed  the  opinion  that  unless  the  war  ended 
in  "downright  German  defeat"  there  would  be  no  German 
revolution,  and  that  the  German  middle  classes  and  "lib- 
erals" would  maintain  German  militarism  "by  hook  and 
crook." 

The  minority  Socialists  favor  a  revolution,  only  provided 
there  shall  be  a  simultaneous  revolution  in  Italy,  France  and 
England.  In  other  words,  they  are  Bolsheviki  in  this  crucial 
question. 

The  position  taken  at  Zimmerwald  was  in  complete  accord 
with  that  of  the  Bolsheviki.  The  responsibility  for  the  war 
is  placed  equally  on  all  belligerents,  without  so  much  as  a 
mention  of  the  democracy  of  one  side  or  the  autocracy  of 
the  other.  The  war  is  attributed  to  "capitalism  and  imper- 
ialism" on  both  sides.  Yet,  at  about  this  same  time,  Karl 
Kautsky,  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  German  minority,  was 
clearly  formulating  (in  Die  Neue  Zeit  of  September  15) 
the  very  opposite  opinion.  We  read  in  this  official  organ 
liie  following  passage,  which  doubtless  accounts  for  his 
prompt  dismissal  as  editor: 

The  present  war  is  a  fight  not  merely  between  dif- 
ferent imperialism,  but  also  between  imperialism  and 
•  democracy,  between  more  or  less  democratic  and  more 
or  less  imperialist  and  militarist  States.  *  *  * 
The  end  of  the  war  seems,  in  spite  of  everything,  to  be 
going  to  signify  the  collapse  of  imperialism  and  its  tools 
and  a  mighty  advance  of  democracy,  though  not  yet 
the  complete  victory  of  the  proletariat. 

These  words  of  the  world's  leading  Socialist  authority 
do  not  express  any  new  or  unfamiliar  Socialist  opinion.  For 
half  a  century  the  Socialists  of  all  countries  have  contrasted 
the  relatively  democratic  institutions  of  England  and  France 
and  America  with  the  relatively  autocratic  institutions  of 
the  Czar  and  the  Kaiser.  The  German  Bolshevist  statement 
that  the  war  is  equally  imperialistic  and  capitalistic  on  both 
sides  is  due,  not  to  ignorance,  but  to  partisanship. 

The  action  decided  upon  at  the  third  Zimmerwald  con- 
ference was  "an  international  general  strike  to  end  the 
war."  Of  course  this  "international"  resolution  was  invalu- 
able to  the  German  Government  in  its  effective  revolutionary 
propaganda  in  Italy — which  caused  the  Italian  debacle. 

The  peace  terms  of  the  German  minority  are  expressed 
by  the  International  Socialist  Committee,  which  for  the  last 
ten  months  has  been  preparing  for  the  notorious  Stockholm 
conference  (under  the  protection  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment). These  terms  are  almost  precisely  those  of  the 
famous  Reichstag  resolution.  Independent  States  are  to  be 
carved  out  of  Russian  territory,  but  neither  Austria,  Ger- 
many, nor  Turkey  is  to  lose  any  territory  whatever,  with 
the  single  exception  of  Armenia.  Various  elusive  and  worth- 
less forms  of  "autonomy"  are  offered  instead,  such  as  "the 
personal  autonomy  of  the  Jews  in  Palestine,"  "kultural 
autonomy"  for  the  Italian  provinces  of  Austria,  "autonomy 
as  complete  as  possible"  for  the  Polish  districts  in  Germany 
and  Austria,  "economic  equality"  for  the  Southern  Slavs 
and  Bohemia  to  be  "connected"  with  Austria,  whether  she 
desires  it  or  not.  But  in  the  case  of  Ireland  political  inde- 
pendence was  offered ! 

All  the  leading  German  parties  then  are  agreed  in  reject- 
ing  the  peace  terms  of  world  democracy.  They  are  also 
all  agreed  in  working  for  revolutions  in  the  democratic 
countries,  in  the  hope  that  such  revolutions  will  end  the  war 


in  a  way  satisfactory  to  Germans.  From  German  Junkers 
to  German  Bolsheviki  there  is  agreement  on  these  two 
policies. 

If  our  military  pressure  is  sufficiently  powerful  and  con- 
tinues long  enough,  we  may  expect  growing  revolutionary 
movements  among  the  Slavs  of  Austria,  and  President  Wil- 
son's policy  is  invaluable  for  encouraging  these  movements. 
For  in  this  way  the  military  position  of  the  Germanic  al- 
liance may  be  seriously  weakened.  Not  only  the  German 
Bolsheviki,  but  also  the  pro-war  Socialists,  as  well  as  sec- 
tions of  the  Catholic  and  Radical  parties,  may  then  be  in- 
clined toward  a  democratic  peace,  and  even  toward  a  Ger- 
man revolution  without  a  compensating  revolution  in 
France.  However,  this  result  would  be  due  not  to  any 
deliberate  policy  of  the  German  Bolsheviki,  but  to  their 
recognition  of  impending  military  defeat,  due  to  the  suc- 
cess of  our  military  and  diplomatic  offensives. 

Postcript — The  Socialists  and  the  Reichstag  Peace 
Resolution 

The  Reichstag  peace  resolution  of  July  19th  scarcely 
created  a  ripple  in  America  or  any  of  the  Entente  countries 
at  the  time,  and  the  President  paid  very  little  attention  to  it 
until  February  8th.  The  reason  is  obvious.  Not  only  was 
the  resolution  based  on  the  idea  of  a  central  European  em- 
pire dominating  the  whole  of  central  Europe  but  it  was  so 
vaguely  worded  as  to  allow  certain  forms  of  political  pro- 
tectorates over  neighboring  countries  which  amounted  to 
veiled  annexations.  All  of  the  chief  supporters  of  the  reso- 
lution at  the  time  have  made  it  clear  by  their  speeches  that 
they  intended  that  Germany  should  preserve  her  political  and 
economic  perdominance  in  all  directions.  The  radicals, 
Schulze-Gaevernitz  and  Dr.  Mueller  (Meiningen),  the 
Catholic  Erzberger  and  even  some  of  the  prorgovernment 
Socialists  spoke  of  "territorial  readjustments"  and  also  of 
"economic  and  military  guarantees"  to  be  demanded  from 
neighboring  countries  in  all  directions.  The  imperialistic 
purpose  of  the  resolution  was  so  clear  that  the  minority 
Socialists  opposed  it.  As  late  as  November,  Haase,  the 
leader  of  the  minority  Socialists,  referred  to  this  resolution 
as  follows  in  the  Reichstag:  "The  gentlemen  of  the  Cen- 
ter will  not  dispute  the  fact  that  even  before  this  peace  reso- 
lution it  was  planned  to  annex  Courland  and  Lithuania.  It 
is  believed  that  the  peace  resolution  was  expressly  prepared 
in  such  a  form  to  cover  this  plan.  Now  we  hear  from  the 
leaders  of  the  Center  and  the  Radicals  that  these  terri- 
tories are  not  to  be  acquired  by  force  but  that  they  are  to 
be  acquired  through  an  "understanding"  which  they  defined 
as  being  of  the  same  character  as  the  understanding  we 
reached  with  the  French  government  about  Alsace-Lor- 
raine (in  1871)  !  On  the  19th  of  July  we  did  not  make 
ourselves  accomplices  of  any  kind  in  this  effort  at  decep- 
tion." That  is,  the  German  minority  Socialists  understood 
the  Reichstag  resolution,  as  all  the  rest  of  the  world  under- 
stood it,  as  the  position  of  the  central  European  party,  the 
advocates  of  veiled  annexations  and  helpless  little  buffer 
states  as  against  the  extreme  annexationists  of  the  General 
Staff. 

Haase  proceeds  to  say  that  even  this  program  of  veiled 
aggression  is  now  declared  obsolete  by  at  least  two  of  the 
three  parties  that  supported  it,  namely,  the  Radicals  and 
the  Center.  On  this  point  Haase  says:  "We  have  never 
had  any  doubt  that  when  this  peace  resolution  was  con- 
trived it  was  purely  the  expression  of  the  war  situation  at 
that  moment  and  that  as  soon  as  a  change  occurred  on  the 
battlefield  the  resolution  would  be  immediately  thrown 
aside." 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  understand  the  President's 
object  in  his  repeated  references  to  the  Reichstag  majority 


resolution.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  he  is  deceived 
as  to  the  real  attitude  of  the  German  "liberals"  and  we  have 
no  reason  whatever  to  suppose  that  the  President  has  aban- 
doned the  democratic  peace  principles  he  has  formulated 
on  April  2d,  May  26th,  June  4th,  December  4th  and  Janu- 
ary 8th.  His  object  is  undoubtedly  to  force  the  German 
"liberals"  out  into  the  open,  just  as  it  is  to  force  the  Aus- 
trian government  into  the  open.  Have  they  abandoned  the 
Reichstag  resolution?  H  they  have  not  abandoned  it  what 
is  its  exact  and  concrete  interpretation? 

The  advantage  of  securing  this  formulation  of  the  posir 
tion  of  the  German  "liberals"  is  twofold.  The  friction  be- 
tween them  and  the  government  is  advantageous  to  the 
Entente,  and  it  is  equally  certain  that  their  attitude,  how- 
ever aggressive,  anti-democratic  and  hostile  to  a  lasting 
peace,  is  less  aggressive  than  that  of  the  Junkers  them- 
selves. 

It  is,  however,  extremely  important  that  the  President's 
precise  object  should  be  pointed  out  again  and  again.  For 
his  repeated  references  to  the  Reichstag  resolution  might  be 
interpreted  as  an  endorsement  of  the  German  "liberals" 
or  as  an  endorsement  of  that  resolution  as  interpreted  by 
the  German  "liberals." 

The  President  does  not  even  endorse  the  Reichstag  reso- 
lution in  any  interpretation.  All  he  does  is  to  refer  to 
its  acceptance  of  the  no  annexations  no  indemnities 
formula.  He  says,  "The  Reichstag  resolution  of  July 
thus  frankly  accepted  all  decisions  of  that  court  (of 
mankind)."  Further  the  President  says  that  these  princi- 
ples are  those  apparently  accepted  by  the  German  "liberals" 
"as  far  as  we  can  judge."  It  is  clear  that  the  President 
uses  the  same  tactics  towards  the  German  "liberals"  as  he 
uses  towards  the  Austrian  government.    He  picks  out  their 


most  democratic  expression  and  emphasizes  this  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  everything  else.  His  underlying  object  is  to 
force  them  to  more  clear  and  definite  statements. 

But  what  was  the  President's  immediate  purpose  of  issu- 
ing his  pronouncement  at  the  moment  he  did  (Feb.  8th)  ? 
Undoubtedly  he  hopes  that  a  more  definite  alignment  of 
the  various  political  elements  in  Germany  and  Austria  will 
help  to  keep  alive  the  opposition  to  Germany  both  in  North 
and  South  Russia  and  among  the  Slavs  of  Austria.  If  the 
Austrian  government  and  the  German  "liberals"  are  proved 
to  favor  annexations  by  Germany  in  a  veiled  form,  this 
will  fan  the  flame  smouldering  in  the  embers  in  Russia  and 
Austria.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  any  considerable  part  of 
the  Reichstag  majority  (for  example,  the  pro-war  Social- 
ists) accepts  the  democratic  interpretation  of  the  formula 
of  no  annexations  no  indenmities  and  the  self-determina- 
tion of  nationalities,  all  the  anti-Kaiser  movement  in  Rus- 
sia will  receive  greater  encouragement.  This  applies  espe- 
cially to  the  minor  nationalities  of  Russia,  such  as  the  Poles, 
Lithuania,  Roumanians,  etc.,  who  are  closely  in  touch  with 
the  Germans  and  know  them  better  than  the  Russians  and 
are  hence  more  hostile. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  necessities  of  diplomacy  do 
not  permit  that  such  points  as  those  above  mentioned  should 
be  made  clear  in  the  diplomatic  messages  themselves — for 
the  result  of  misinterpretation  on  public  opinion  in  the  En- 
tente countries  is  deplorable.  The  best  that  can  be  done 
is  the  semi-official  interpretation  issued  from  Washington 
and  printed  by  the  New  York  Times  and  other  newspapers 
explaining  that  the  message  did  not  indicate  either  the  de- 
sire for  immediate  peace,  a  belief  that  peace  was  drawing 
near,  or  that  the  formulations  of  democratic  peace  terms 
made  on  January  8th  were  withdrawn. 


III.     German  Unity  Not  Yet  Seriously  Menaced 


Of  course  there  are  a  few  extremists  at  both  ends  of 
the  social  scale  who  advocate  a  peace  policy  at  variance 
with  that  of  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  nation.  But 
all  these  extremists  together  probably  do  not  represent  ten 
per  cent  of  the  German  nation,  and  certainly  do  not  repre- 
sent twenty  per  cent. 

The  leaders  of  the  revolutionary  Socialists — Liebknecht, 
Luxemburg  and  others — are  nearly  all  in  prison.  They  are 
politically  utterly  insignificant,  having  only  one  member 
of  the  Reichstag  out  of  400.  Nor  is  their  power  increase 
ing.  They  are  to  be  sharply  distinguished  from  the  minority 
Socialists,  who  have  a  considerable  following,  but  are  neither 
revolutionary  nor  efifective  in  their  opposition  to  the  Kaiser. 
And  the  peace  policy  of  this  minority  does  not  differ  in  any 
essential  particular  from  that  of  the  other  parties,  which 
constitute  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  German  people. 

At  the  other  end  of  the  social  scale  is  another  body  of 
extremists,  who  can  lay  no  claim  to  represent  the  nation, 
but  have  exercised  a  very  considerable  and  sinister  influence 
over  the  Kaiser  and  the  government.  This  is  the  group  of 
junker  extremists  headed  by  the  Crown  Prince.  In  the 
Reichstag  they  can  rely  upon  the  support  only  of  the  Con- 
servatives and  of  a  handful  of  members  of  other  parties. 
They  are  not  even  able  to  secure  the  entire  support  of  the 
junkers  or  Conservatives,  and  probably  do  not  constitute 
more  than  15  per  cent  of  the  nation,  as  indicated  by  elec- 
tion returns.  This  group  is  in  favor  of  a  military  dictator- 
ship, and  believes  in  curtailing  the  power  of  the  Reichstag 
Naturally,  its  support  in  the  Reichstag  is  not  great.    Many 


junkers  and  bureaucrats  like  Bethmann-Hollweg,  oppose 
this  group,  and  even  the  Kaiser  has  only  followed  its  advice 
intermittently.  The  point  about  these  reactionary  extremists 
is  that  they  cannot  and  do  not  claim  to  represent  the  nation, 
but  only  endeavor  to  control  the  Kaiser  and  government, 
which  is  solely  responsible  to  him  in  war  time. 

Nation  Is  United 

All  the  rest  of  the  nation  is  thoroughly  united  as  to  the 
war  and  the  peace  terms  that  are  confidently  expected  to 
follow  within  the  next  few  months.  These  parties  include 
both  wings  of  the  Social  Democrats,  minority  and  majority, 
the  Radical  Party,  a  part  of  the  National  Liberal  Party, 
and  the  Center  or  Catholic  Party — only  to  mention  the  most 
important.  These  parties  alone  secured  over  eighty  per  cent 
of  the  votes  at  the  last  election  (in  1912). 

It  is  not  necessary  to  compare  the  peace  program  of  all 
five  of  these  groups;  it  is  sufficient  to  compare  the  most 
radical  and  the  most  conservative  of  the  five,  namely,  the 
Center  Party  on  the  one  hand  and  the  minority  Socialists 
on  the  other.  The  position  of  the  Center  may  be  defined 
by  their  almost  universal  sympathy  with  the  peace  policy 
of  the  Austrian  Kaiser  and  the  Pope.  It  is  this  group  also 
that  stood  behind  the  so-called  peace  resolution  of  the 
Reichstag  and  the  German  Government's  reply  to  the  Pope. 
At  the  other  extreme  we  find  the  German  minority  Social- 
ists, whose  position  we  can  obtain  from  their  own  state- 
ment issued  early  in  July  and  from  the  later  peace  pro- 


8 


grams  of  the  Stockholm  Conference  and  the  Russian  Coun- 
cil of  Workmen  and  Soldiers.  These  last-mentioned  pro- 
grams were  issued  in  October,  after  consultation  with  the 
German  minority,  and  are  indorsed  by  them. 

If  we  rapidly  compare  the  peace  policy  of  the  German 
Center  and  that  of  the  minority  Socialists,  we  find  that 
they  are  practically  identical,  and  the  intervening  parties, 
the  majority  Socialists  and  the  so-called  Radical  party,  of 
course  take  a  similar  position. 

All  these  parties  agree  in  the  claim  that  they  are  in  favor 
of  "peace"  and  that  the  democratic  nations,  England,  France 
and  America,  are  "prolonging  the  war."  All  agree  in  sup- 
porting the  German  Government  in  its  empty  talk  of  "dis- 
armament." All  reject  the  idea  of  a  league  to  enforce 
peace  or  a  society  of  nations,  as  favored  by  nearly  all  par- 
ties of  England,  France  and  America.  The  Germans  favor 
a  so-called  disarmament,  because  their  victories  in  the  war 
have  been  due  mainly  to  their  immensely  superior  capacity 
for  producing  armament,  when  compared  to  the  other  na- 
tions of  Europe. 

If  all  existing  supplies  of  armament  were  destroyed,  the 
Germans,  with  their  superior  military  organizartion  and 
higher  degree  of  industrial  organization  and  greater  pro- 
ducing power,  could  overwhelm  Europe  even  more  easily 
than  they  did  this  time.  It  was  by  a  similar  process  of 
reasoning  that  certain  German  militarists  before  the  war 
proposed  that  the  term  of  military  service  for  all  European 
nations  be  reduced  one  year.  The  argument  was  that  the 
German  military  machine  could  produce  good  soldiers  in 
less  space  of  time  than  the  other  military  machines,  and 
that  such  a  method  would  increase  the  relative  military  su- 
periority of  Germany. 

Opposed  to  Peace  League 

The  overwhelming  majority  of  Germans  of  all  these  par- 
ties are  opposed  to  a  league  to  enforce  peace  and  a  society 
of  nations,  because  in  such  a  society  Germany  would  be 
in  a  minority.  There  is  no  method  of  reckoning  by  which 
she  would  count  for  something  more  than  one-sixth  of 
the  total  voting  power.  Even  with  her  allies  and  the  little 
neighboring  nations  under  her  economic  and  military  dom- 
ination the  forces  against  her  would  be  more  than  2  to  1 
in  any  such  organization.  In  this,  as  in  all  other  important 
points,  the  minority  Socialists  are  in  absolute  agreement 
with  the  Center  and  even  with  most  of  the  National  Liberals. 

All  these  parties  are  in  substantial  agreement  also  on 
nearly  all  the  most  important  territorial  questions.  They 
all  stand  for  the  restoration  of  the  territorial  status  quo 
ante,  with  certain  .modifications.  They  all  reckon  upon 
the  continued  economic  domination  of  Austria,  Bulgaria, 
Turkey,  Sweden,  Denmark,  Switzerland  and  Holland  by 
Germany  after  the  war.  They  all  demand  the  restitution 
of  the  German  colonies.  They  all  demand  that  German 
and  Austrian  Poland  shall  remain  German  and  Austrian. 

On  the  question  of  plebiscites  in  disputed  territories  there 
are  many  shades  of  opinion,  but  the  prevailing  opinion  i? 
that  plebiscites  may  be  safely  demanded  under  such  condi- 
tions as  will  make  a  pro-German  decision  absolutely  cer- 
tain. For  example  the  Stockholm  Conference  wishes  a 
plebiscite  in  Alsace-Lorraine  on  the  basis  of  "the  voting 
lists  of  the  latest  election  in  Alsace  before  the  war."  There 
is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  any  of  these  parties  will  refuse 
to  accept  this  principle  both  for  Alsace  and  for  certain 
other  territories,  where  non-Germans  have  been  driven  out 
and  sufficient  Germans  substituted  in  recent  years  to  assure 
a  German  majority. 


On  the  other  hand,  the  refusal  of  the  right  of  self- 
government  in  case  the  subject  peoples  of  Germany  and 
her  allies  is  reversed  and  turned  into  a  demand  for  com- 
plete independence  in  the  case  of  Finland  and  Russian 
Poland  and  other  entente  territories.  We  find  these  de- 
mands asserted  not  only  by  the  German  Liberals  but  also 
by  the  Stockholm  Conference  and  the  Russian  Workmen's 
Council.  The  former  body  has  added  a  demand  for  inde- 
pendence for  Ireland,  while  the  latter  demands  the  "re- 
establishment"  of  Persia.  The  Stockholm  Conference  even 
indorses  the  demand  of  the  German  junkers  that  Belgium 
be  divided  into  two  autonomous  provinces.  The  Russian 
Workmen's  Council  does  a  similar  service  for  the  junkers 
in  demanding  the  "neutralization"  of  the  Suez  and  Panama 
Canals  as  well  as  the  Dardanelles.  We  saw  what  neutrali- 
zation amounts  to  in  the  case  of  Belgium,  but  this  does  not 
disturb  the  self-appointed  agents  of  German  socialism  in 
Russia. 

There  are  also  several  shades  of  opinion  about  indemni- 
ties. There  have  been  well-substantiated  reports  that  a 
number  of  influential  groups  in  the  German  Government 
are  prepared  to  grant  a  nominal  psuedo  indemnity  to  Bel- 
gium in  order  to  quiet  the  international  clamor  about  the 
wrongs  done  to  that  country.  All  the  German  parties  men- 
tioned favor  this  diplomatic  subterfuge.  The  Stockholm 
Conference  and  the  Russian  Workmen's  Council  agree  that 
a  certain  insignificant  part  of  the  damages  are  to  be  paid 
by  Germany;  all  other  waste,  destruction  and  wrongs  to 
civilians  done  by  German  armies  are  to  be  repaired 
from  an  international  fund,  to  which  Germany's 
victims  and  their  defenders  are  to  contribute  equally  with 
Germany!  These  two  principles,  certainly  unobjectionable 
to  the  majority  of  German  Liberals  and  Centrists,  are  to 
be  applied  generally  as  well  as  in  Belgium. 

Haase  and  Ledebour  and  other  leaders  of  the  German 
Socialist  minority  have  secured  a  certain  prestige  in  the 
entente  countries  because  of  the  strong  verbal  opposition 
they  occasionally  oflfer  to  the  Kaiser  when  home  affairs  are 
up  for  discussion  in  the  Reichstag.  It  is  assumed  by  innum- 
erable editors  and  publicists  in  this  country  that  because 
these  men  represent  the  German  Socialist  minority  their 
view  of  the  war  and  their  peace  terms  are  probably  the 
opposite  of  that  of  the  German  Socialist  majority.  The 
truth  is  that'  the  two  peace  programs  are  ninety  per  cent 
the  same,  and  that  on  all  the  most  essential  points  they  are 
identical. 

The  underlying  motive  and  psychology  of  the  minority 
may  be  shown  from  the  following  sentence  from  their  July 
peace  manifesto:  "National  and  social  liberation  cannot 
be  achieved  by  the  governments  at  war ;  it  can  only  be  done 
by  democracy."  This  is  the  phrase  by  which  this  party 
covers  its  unwillingness  to  demand  self-government  for 
such  of  the  subject  nationalities  of  Germany  and  her  allies 
as  desire  it — as  an  essential  condition  of  the  coming  peace. 
But  while  deferring  the  demand  for  national  independence 
to  the  coming  of  democracy,  this  same  party  refuses  to 
allow  that  the  demand  for  democratization  should  be  made 
part  of  the  peace  terms !  Together  with  all  the  German 
political  parties  above  mentioned  the  Socialist  minority  de- 
nies that  democracy  is  in  any  way  an  issue  of  the  war ! 

That  the  leaders  of  the  German  Socialist  minority  are 
absolutely  loyal  to  the  Kaiser  in  the  war  they  have  rer 
peatedly  demonstrated.  Perhaps  the  most  conclusive  evi- 
dence may  be  gained  from  speeches  made  by  the  two  most 
important  leaders  in  the  Reichstag  since  the  Russian  revo- 
lution. Both  Haase  and  Ledebour  advocated  in  the  Reich- 
stag a  separate  peace  with  Russia. 


IV.     Herr  Scheidemann,  President  Wilson,  and  German  Socialists 


A  new  "pacifist"  has  arisen  in  Kaiserland.  Philip 
Scheidemann,  leader  of  the  Majority  Socialists,  is  now  put 
forward  as  the  spokesman  of  a  genuine,  democratic  peace 
movement.  Early  last  summer  it  was  Erzberger,  leader 
of  the  Center  or  Catholic  Party  in  the  Reichstag,  that  was 
to  lead  the  German  nation  to  demand  a  reasonable  peace. 
Erzberger,  followed  by  Scheidemann,  did  get  the  Reichstag 
to  adopt  a  resolution  which  claimed  to  favor  a  democratic 
peace.  But  it  did  not  give  any  concrete  applications  to  its 
vague  and  ambiguous  phrases. 

Erzberger,  interpreting  the  resolution  in  concrete  terms, 
showed  that  he  did  not  propose  that  Germany  should  freely 
surrender  anything — though  she  might  sell  some  of  her 
plunder — in  exchange  for  other  territorial  or  economic 
concessions. 

The  Radicals  and  the  Majority  Socialists  issued  similar 
interpretations.  Even  Count  Czernin,  speaking  for  the 
Austrian  Government,  adopted  the  Reichstag  formula,  and 
has  continued  to  toy  with  variations  of  the  same  up  to 
the  present  moment.  Yet  when  he  repeated  his  phrases 
the  other  day  and  said  there  was  good  hope  of  "peace 
by  negotiation"  with  President  Wilson  he  could  specify  but 
one  concrete  point,  Russia,  upon  which  they  might  agree — 
while  he  definitely  stated  that  he  intended  to  stand  by 
Germany  at  every  point.  What  that  means  we  can  see  in 
the  "peace"  statement  of  the  German  Chancellor,  Hertling 
— issued  on  the  same  day.  Hertling  specifically  denies  all 
nine  of  the  concrete  points  of  President  Wilson's  peace  pro- 
gram of  January  8th. 

Scheidernann's  Pretentions  Closely  Scrutinized 

But  how  about  Scheidemann — leader  of  2,000,000  So- 
cialists? Scheidemann  says  he  agrees  with  eleven  out  of 
the  fourteen  points  of  Mr.  Wilson's  program.  But  does 
he?  Surely  we  have  ceased  to  believe  literally  every  word 
that  conies  out  of  Germany — even  if  spoken  by  Socialists. 
We  know  the  role  of  stool-pigeons  played  by  these  Social- 
ists— both  Minority  and  Majority — at  the  Stockholm  Con- 
ference— a  role  so  bold  and  so  treacherous  to  the  cause  of 
democratic  peace  that  President  Wilson  exposed  the  con- 
ference as  a  trick  of  the  Kaiser  and  refused  passports  for 
American  citizens. 

Why  should  we  attach  any  credence  to  Scheidemann? 
It  may  be  doubted  if  any  German  alive  has  been  so  service- 
able to  the  Kaiser  and  his  war.  It  is  true  Scheidemann 
made  a  heated  attack  on  the  ultra-militarist  junker  clique 
now  in  control  in  Berlin.  But  one  may  be  a  militarist  and 
still  oppose  the  ultra-militarists. 

Scheidemann,  Erzberger  &  Co.  are  standrpatters  on  the 
subject  of  militarism.  They  want  German  militarism  to 
be  preserved  intact,  precisely  as  it  was  before  the  war. 
That  is,  they  want  a  drawn  war,  and  a  return  to  the  terri- 
torial status  quo  that  previously  existed.  Germany  would 
then  be  surrounded  partly  by  small  neutral  states  she  has 
now  terrorized  and  partly  by  exhausted  countries  like  Rus- 
sia, Italy  and  France,  which  would  easily  become  the  prey 
of  her  superior  military  and  economic  power.  These  ter- 
ritories she  would  gradually  annex — economically.  In  the 
meanwhile  she  would  at  once  annex — politically  and  eco- 
nomically— her  present  allies:  Austria,  Hungary,  Bulgaria 
and  Turkey. 

When  Scheidemann  says  he  agrees  with  all  of  President 
Wilson's  terms  but  three,  this  is  what  he  means — and  the 
fact  is  demonstrated  by  many  recent  speeches  as  well  as 
the  Party  Congress  only  a  few  weeks  ago.  It  is  true  that 
the  junker  clique  in  power  wants  far  more  than  this,  and 


therefore  there  is  bitter  discord.  Scheidemann  says  Ger- 
many can't  be  beaten  and  that  the  Entente  knows  it,  also 
that  Germany  cannot  win  more  victories  except  at  too  high 
a  price.  Therefore,  let  her  cash  in  her  past  victories  now 
and  avoid  useless  bloodshed  and  a  trade  war  after  the 
war.  But  his  attack  on  the  junkers  is  largely  based  on 
domestic  politics,  the  franchise,  food,  freedom  of  the  press, 
etc.  Without  these  questions  the  quarrel  about  peace  terms 
could  not  be  very  acute.  For  Scheidemann's  plan  would 
assure  a  German  domination  of  Europe  almost  as  rapid 
and  complete  as  the  junker  plan  of  immediate  annexations 
and  indemnities. 


Fail  to  Agree  With  Important  Points 

Scheidemann  says  he  agrees  with  eleven  out  of  the  four- 
teen points  of  Wilson's  program.  Let  us  see.  Five  of 
these  points  are  abstract.  Even  Hertling  claims  to  agree 
with  these  five  points,  though  we  know  his  interpretation 
and  Wilson's  are  diametrically  opposed. 

There  remains  eleven  concrete  points.  Scheidemann  does 
not  pretend  to  agree  on  Alsace-Lorraine,  Poland,  or  the 
Italian  provinces — three  of  the  most  colossal  territorial 
problems  of  the  war.  German  insistence  on  continued  en- 
slavement of  any  one  of  these  important  territories  with 
their  millions  of  inhabitants  would  alone  suffice  to  prolong 
the  war  indefinitely. 

There  remains  eight  concrete  points  upon  which  Scheide- 
mann, taking  advantage  of  Mr.  Wilson's  liberal  and  diplo- 
matic phraseology,  claims  to  agree.    Again,  let  us  see. 

Scheidemann  claims  to  agree  on  Russia.  But  there  is  the 
Polish  problem,  involving  German  and  Austrian  as  well  as 
Russian  Poland.  Scheidemann  does  not  agree  to  this  inde- 
pendent Poland,  though  it  is  the  crux  of  the  Russian 
problem. 

Scheidemann  claims  to  agree  about  Belgium.  But  he  is 
opposed  to  indemnities,  and  the  President  requires  com- 
plete "restoration" — and  by  Germany.  The  same  differ- 
ence arises  as  to  Serbia,  Roumania  and  Northern  France. 

Scheidemann  takes  advantage  of  the  President's  broad 
phrases  about  the  future  of  the  subject  nationalities  of  Aus- 
tria and  Turkey.  Scheidemann  and  Wilson  both  demand 
autonomy.  But  Scheidemann  demands  mere  autonomy 
and  his  party  considers  that  this  is  a  question  for  Austria 
and  Turkey  to  settle  for  themselves.  President  Wilson 
takes  the  very  opposite  view.  He  demands  "the  freest  op- 
portunty"  and  again  "an  absolutely  unmolested  opportu- 
nity" for  "autonomous  development."  He  does  not  even 
use  the  substantive  word  "autonomy" — and  he  suggests 
the  "sovereignty"  of  the  Turkish  Government  only  for  the 
Turkish  portions  of  Turkey.  Nor  does  he  agree  that  this 
is  an  Austrian  or  a  Turkish  problem.  On  the  contrary,  he 
had  explained  at  length — in  his  message  to  Congress  less 
than  five  weeks  previously — that  these  territories  must  be 
freed  from  Prussian  domination.  Moreover,  he  now  spe- 
cifically demands  "economic"  freedom  for  certain  of  the 
disputed  territories — a  principle  that  he  would  certainly 
apply  generally,  as  we  can  see  from  his  repeated  discussion 
of  the  economic  principles  of  a  just  settlement. 

Scheidemann  a  Strong  Colonialist 

There  remains  only  the  question  of  the  German  colonies. 
Scheidemann  has  always  been  a  colonialist.  Undoubtedly 
he  expects  the  German  colonies  to  be  largely  restored,  as 
his  party  demands.  If  there  is  peace  in  the  near  future — 
as  Scheidemann  contemplates — this  means  there  will  have 


10 


been  no  revolutionary  political  change  in  Germany;  and 
we  can  be  certain  that  Mr.  Wilson's  declared  principle 
of  protecting  the  natives'  rights  will  prevent  the  surren- 
der of  a  square  foot  of  territory  or  semi-junker  govern- 
ment. 

We  can  be  certain  then  that  a  careful  examination  would 
show  that  Herr  Scheidemann  does  not  agree  with  a  single 
one  of  Mr.  Wilson's  peace  principles — Herr  Scheidemann 
himself  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding.  And  Mr.  Wil- 
son's principles  are  not  there  for  trading  purposes.  Each 
one  involves  the  liberty  of  some  great  population  or  the 
peace  of  the  world.  Not  one,  therefore,  can  be  surren- 
dered. As  Mr.  Wilson  has  repeatedly  pointed  out,  there 
is  no  room  for  any  compromise." 

Nor  are  the  German  Minority  Socialists  much  more 
democratic  in  their  peace  ideas.  Even  more  than  the  Ma- 
jority, they  were  behind  the  Stockholm  agitation  to  let  the 
anti-war  Socialist  minorities  in  the  Entente  countries  set- 
tle the  war.  They  are  also  behind  the  present  Soviet  "gov- 
ernment" in  Russia  and  are  close  to  the  Bolsheviki — though 
they  do  not  agree  with  them  that  there  should  be  any 
revolution  just  now  in  Germany  (the  only  point  upon  which 
the  western  democracies  do  agree  with  the  Bolsheviki). 

Of  the  nine  concrete  points  in  Mr.  Wilson's  program  it 
is  probable  that  the  Minority  Socialists  agree  in  part  as 
to  two,  the  German  colonies  and  Italian-Austrian — though 
even  on  these  questions  radical,  if  not  insoluble,  differences 
remain.  They  would  also  give  a  very  insufficient  in- 
demnity to  Belgium — an  indemnity  absolutely  unacceptable 
to  the  Entente  (probably  they  would  want  the  German  colo- 
nies to  count  as  that. indemnity). 

On  the  remaining  principles,  involving  Alsace-Lorraine 
(where  they  would  have  a  plebiscite  arranged  to  give  a  Ger- 
man result),  Poland,  Austria,  Turkey  and  the  Balkans — 
any  one  of  these  colossal  problems  a  sufficient  cause  for 
refusing  a  German  peace — they  are  in  accord  with  Scheide- 
mann and  opposed  to  Wilson. 

Let  us  cease  to  delude  ourselves  about  the  German  So- 
cialists— until  we  have  convinced  them  that  what  lies  ahead 
of  Germany  is  not  a  drawn  war — with  a  large  part  of  the 


benefit  of  past  victories  retained  by  Germany — but  a  de- 
cisive and  possibly  an  overwhelming  military  defeat. 

German   Social   Democracy  Might   Outdo   Bolsheviki 

We  hailed  the  overthrow  of  the  Czar — and  we  got  the 
Bolsheviki.  We  are  now  told  to  put  our  faith  in  the  dem- 
ocratization of  Germany.  Yet  an  undefeated  German  So- 
cial-Democracy may  prove  even  more  hostile  than  have  the 
Bolsheviki  to  the  peace  principles  of  the  great  western 
democracies. 

Instead  of  joining  the  great  western  democracies,  the 
Bolsheviki,  regarding  themselves  as  called  upon  to  lead 
the  world,  have  invited  us  to  abandon  the  institutions  we 
have  won  through  centuries  of  struggle  against  autoc- 
racy and  to  follow  them.  In  the  same  way  the  German 
Socialists  regard  themselves  not  as  brother  democrats, 
but  as  leaders,  whom  the  other  people  are  invited  to  fol- 
low. They  are  confirmed  in  this  view  by  the  German 
Socialist  parties  scattered  over  the  world.  Let  us  not 
forget  that  even  the  Bolsheviki  acknowledge  having  gone 
to  school  to  the  German  Socialists,  and  would  at  once 
accept  their  leadership  as  soon  as  they  got  into  power 
in  Germany. 

Having  revolted  against  Czar  and  Kaiser,  these  kinder- 
gartners  in  democracy  would  more  than  ever  insist  that  the 
western  democracies  overthrow  their  tyrants,  Woodrow 
Wilson  and  Lloyd  George !  These  supermen,  unless  pre- 
viously defeated,  would  undertake  to  dictate  the  peace  terms 
in  accordance  with  their  strange  conceptions  of  democracy 
— as  exemplified  by  Scheidemann,  Haase  and  the  Bol- 
sheviki. 

Doubtless  a  German  Social  Democracy  defeated  in  war 
will  be  more  amenable  to  a  genuinely  democratic  peace 
program  than  would  be  a  Junker  caste  defeated  in  war — 
for  the  Junkers  would  scarcely  acknowledge  defeat  in  the 
last  extremities.  Hence,  a  German  revolution  is  invaluable 
— provided  it  is  preceded  or  accompanied  by  German  defeat. 

But  let  us  beware  lest — before  the  German  armies  are 
defeated — a  pseudo  revolution  be  used  to  produce  real 
revolutions  in  Italy  and  France ! 


V.     The  Anti-Democratic  Peace  Terms  of  the  German  Minority 

Socialists 


Can  we  not,  however,  expect  from  the  German  minority 
Socialists  democratic  peace  ideas  more  or  less  in  accord 
with  those  of  President  Wilson?  The  answer  is  that  we 
cannot.  To  suppose  that  we  can  is  to  fly  in  the  face  of 
all  fact  in  as  mad  a  manner  as  the  Bolsheviki  have  done 
in  their  repeated  predictions  that  these  same  German 
minority  Socialists  would  lead  the  fatherland  into  a  revolu- 
tion within  a  few  days. 

The  notorious  Stockholm  peace  conference,  as  the  world 
now  knows,  was  openly  prepared  under  the  constant  super- 
vision and  direction  of  the  German  minority  Socialists,  who 
gave  it  their  full  indorsement.  Also  the  progrom  of  the 
Russian  Soviet  (council  of  workmen  and  soldiers)  was 
elaborated  after  frequent  consultations  with  the  German 
minority.  These  programs  are  in  complete  accord  with 
the  previous  declarations  of  the  minority  Socialists  and  its 
leaders,  but  it  is  better  to  refer  to  the  Stockholm  and  Soviet 
programs  because  these  are  later — dating  from  the  end  of 
October. 

Let  us  then  compare  the  peace  program  of  President  Wil- 
son and  that  of  the  German  minority  Socialists,  point  by 
point. 


1.  President  Wilson  demands  that  the  wrong  done  in 
Alsace-Lorraine  shall  be  righted.  The  German  minority 
Socialists  demand  a  solution  of  this  question,  which  absor 
lutely  insures  that  Alsace-Lorraine  shall  remain  German. 
The  Stockholm  conference  suggests  a  plebiscite  "based  on 
the  voting  list  at  the  latest  election  before  the  war,"  and 
the  Soviet  a  plebiscite  under  the  German  "civil  authori- 
ties." In  view  of  the  vast  French  population  driven  out 
by  the  German  government  and  the  German  colonists  in- 
vited into  this  territory,  this  would  undoubtedly  give  a  Ger- 
man result  in  the  entire  district  of  Alsace-Lorraine  if  the 
two  provinces  were  considered  together,  and  certainly  in 
Alsace  if  the  two  provinces  were  considered  separately. 

2.  The  German  minority  Socialists  at  the  Stockholm 
conference  offered  the  Italians  of  Austria  the  absurd  right 
of  "kultural  autonomy  only."  President  Wilson  demands: 
"A  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy  should  be  effected 
along  clearly  recognizable  lines  of  nationality." 

Wilson  Demands  Polish  State 

3.  President  Wilson  demands  a  Polish  state  including 
all    territories   "inhabited   by   undisputably   Polish   popula- 


H 


tions,"  which  means  half  of  Austrian  GaHcia  and  large 
sections  of  German  Poland.  In  opposition  to  this  the  Stock- 
holm conference  demands  an  independent  Poland  to  be 
carved  from  Russia  only,  while  the  Polish  districts  in  Aus- 
tria and  Germany  are  to  be  satisfied  by  the  vague  gift  of 
"as  complete  an  autonomy  as  possible";  the  Russian  Soviet 
echoes  the  same  view. 

4.  The  German  Socialists  in  the  Stockholm  conference 
demanded  that  all  the  Slavic  and  Rumanian  subjects  of 
Austria-Hungary  be  forced  to  remain  under  that  sovereignty 
and  to  accept  an  undefined  "autonomy." 

The  President's  declaration  as  to  the  peoples  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  like  that  of  Lloyd  George,  appears  also  to  be 
somewhat  vague.  The  President  demanded  for  these  na- 
tionalities only  "the  freest  opportunity  of  autonomous  de- 
velopment." But  the  President  has  spoken  no  word  to  sug- 
gest that  he  has  withdrawn  his  previous  discussions  of  this 
same  theme.  In  his  statement  issued  thirty  days  before 
the  January  declaration  (namely,  the  war  message  to  con- 
gress on  December  4)  the  President  made  the  following 
declaration  concerning  the  rulers  of  Germany  and  the  peace 
that  he  would  make  with  them. 

"They  have  established  a  power  over  other  lands  and 
peoples  than  their  own — over  the  great  empire  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  over  hitherto  free  Balkan  states,  over  Turkey  and 
within  Asia,  which  must  be  relinquished. 

"The  peace  we  make  must  deliver  the  once  fair  and 
happy  peoples  of  Belgium  and  northern  France  from  the 
Prussian  conquest  and  the  Prussian  menace,  but  it  must 
also  deliver  the  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  the  peoples  of 
the  Balkans,  and  the  peoples  of  Turkey  alike  in  Europe 
and  Asia,  from  the  impudent  and  alien  domination  of  the 
Prussian  military  and  commercial  autocracy." 


Question  of  Indemnities 

6.  President  Wilson  demands  indemnities  or  "restora- 
tion" by  Germany  for  Belgium,  Servia,  Montenegro,  Ru- 
mania and  northern  France.  The  German  minority  Social- 
ists in  the  Stockholm  conference  demanded  that  in  every 
case  except  that  of  Belgium  this  restoration  should  be  paid 
for  "from  an  international  fund."  The  Soviet  would  not 
even  grant  payments  from  this  international  fund  to  any 
nation  except  Servia,  Montenegro  and  Belgium — leaving 
France  and  Rumania  absolutely  uncompensated  for  dam- 
age done  by  Germany,  although  they  had  done  no  corre- 
sponding damage  in  German  territory. 

7.  President  Wilson  demands  a  reconsideration  of  the 
title  of  Germany  to  her  former  colonies  in  which  "the  in- 
terests of  the  populations  concerned  must  have  equal  weight 
with  the  equitable  claims  of  the  government  whose  title  is 
to  be  determined."  The  Russian  Soviet,  on  the  contrary, 
instigated  by  the  German  minority  Socialists,  demands  that 
the  German  colonies  be  "restored." 

It  might  be  added  that  the  German  minority  Socialists 
have  made  some  demands  of  such  an  aggressive  character 
that  they  are  not  even  supported  by  the  German  govern- 
ment. For  example,  their  formula,  "political  independence" 
for  Ireland — since  Ireland  is  not  one  of  the  countries  which 
has  lost  "its  independence  during  the  war,"  which  is  the 
principle  laid  down  by  the  German  government  in  the  nego- 
tiations with  the  Bolsheviki  in  Brest-Litovsk.  Much  as  it 
desires  to  embarrass  the  British  government,  the  ruling 
class  of  Germany  would  not  dream  of  making  such  an 
absurd  demand — that  is,  publicly,  for  of  course  the  demand 
for  the  independence  of  an  "Irish  Republic"  was  invented 
by  the  German  propagandists  and  launched  by  German 
money  from  Berlin.  However,  this  is  very  far  from  the 
oflicial  indorsement  by  the  German  government. 


Should  Have  Independence 

In  further  elucidation  of  this  same  point  we  may  refer 
to  the  President's  statement  of  June  14,  in  which  he  said 
that  "the  peace  intrigue"  of  Germany  contemplated  binding 
together  "racial  and  political  units  which  can  be  kept  to- 
gether only  by  force,"  and  that  these  peoples  would  be  sat- 
isfied only  by  "undisputed  independence."  The  subject  na- 
tions named  were  the  Czechs,  Croats,  Serbs,  Rumanians 
and  Armenians. 

It  is  perfectly  clear  that  if  the  Czechs  (Bohemians  and 
Slovaks),  Jugo-Slavs  (Servians,  Croatians  and  Slovenians), 
Ukranians  and  Rumanians  of  Austria  demand  undisputed 
independence  they  can  point  to  President  Wilson  and  to 
equally  clear  statements  of  Lloyd  George  as  encouraging 
them  in  their  movement  toward  this  independence.  Al- 
ready in  military  and  domestic  revolts  since  the  war  they 
have  sacrificed  hundreds  of  thousands  of  lives  for  this 
object,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  either  Lloyd 
George  or  Woodrow  Wilson  have  been  abandoning  them — 
in  spite  of  the  somewhat  vague  formulations  of  their  re- 
cent statements.  Possibly  the  diplomatic  explanation  of 
these  recent  statements  lies  in  the  hope  that  these  subject 
nationalities  of  Austria-Hungary  will  combine  with  the 
Socialists  to  force  their  government  to  a  democratic  peace, 
rather  than  emphasizing  their  somewhat  conflicting  and  ill- 
defined  separatist  tendencies  at  the  present  difficult  moment. 

5.  President  Wilson  demands  "an  absolutely  unmolested 
opportunity  of  autonomous  development"  for  the  subject  na- 
tionalities of  Turkey.  The  German  minority  Socialists  in 
the  Stockholm  conference  demanded  that  Armenia  be  re- 
stored to  Turkey.  And  that  a  weird  "personal  autonomy" 
should  be  vouchsafed  to  the  Jews  of  Palestine,  bi"  with- 
out any  territorial  autonomy. 


Removal  of  Economic  Barriers 

8.  President  Wilson  demands  the  removal,  so  far  as 
possible,  of  all  economic  barriers  after  the  war.  But  he 
has  not  withdrawn  his  explicit  statement  in  his  war  mes- 
sage to  congress  on  December  4  in  which  he  declares  that 
in  case  the  German  government  "is  not  utterly  brought 
to  an  end"  the  following  situation  might  arise : 

"It  might  be  impossible  in  such  untoward  circumstances 
to  admit  Germany  to  the  free  economic  intercourse  which 
must  inevitably  spring  out  of  the  other  partnerships  of  a 
real  peace.  But  there  would  be  no  aggression  in  that ;  and 
such  a  situation,  inevitable  because  of  distrust,  would  in  the 
very  nature  of  things  sooner  or  later  cure  itself  by  processes 
which  would  assuredly  set  in." 

Nor  would  this  be  our  only  recourse  against  the  rulers  of 
Germany.  "It  might  be  impossible  to  admit  them  to  the 
partnership  of  nations  which  must  henceforth  guarantee 
the  world's  peace,"  our  national  leader  further  points  out. 

The  German  minority  Socialists,  on  the  contrary,  demand 
the  removal  of  economic  barriers  regardless  of  the  fact 
that  this  may  be  the  most  pacific  and  least  costly  weapon 
to  bring  Kaiserism  to  terms  in  case  its  defeat  in  war  is  not 
sufficiently  complete. 

9.  Our  President  demands  absolute  freedom  of  the  seas 
"except  as  the  seas  may  be  closed  in  whole  or  in  part  by 
international  action  for  the  enforcement  of  international 
covenants."  The  German  minority  Socialists,  far  from 
making  any  exception  such  as  the  above,  go  to  the  oppo- 
site extreme.  They  demand  a  very  radical  step  toward  the 
disarmamert  of  the  British  sea  power,  without  any  corre- 
spondingly radical  step  toward  the  disarmament  of  the  Ger- 
man land  power.  Despite  the  lessons  of  the  war  they  cling 
to  the  obsolete  pacifist  demand  for  the  "inviolability  of  pri- 


12 


vate  property  at  sea,"  which  would  prevent  the  present 
blockade  of  Germany  by  sea  and  deprive  civilization  of  the 
most  civilized  weapon  against  autocracies.  For  today,  as 
throughout  history,  the  great  militarist  autocracies  are  land 
powers. 

Disagree  on  Dardanelles 

Moreover,  while  President  Wilson  demands  the  neutrali- 
zation of  the  Dardanelles,  the  German  minority  Socialists 
destroy  the  value  of  a  similar  demand  made  by  them  when 
they  add  to  it  the  neutralization  of  the  Suez  and  Panama 
Canals,  which  are  in  no  way  involved  in  the  war.  The  only 
effect  of  this  demand  also  would  be  to  further  cripple  the 
pacific  sea  powers  as  compared  with  the  militaristic  land 
powers  and  to  rob  the  coming  league  of  nations  of  its  most 
effective  means  of  preserving  world  peace. 

But,  after  all,  why  should  we  suppose  that — working  un- 


der the  extremely  difficult  conditions  that  prevail  in  Ger- 
many— President  Wilson  should  be  able  to  convert  the  Ger- 
man Socialists  to  America's  peace  views?  Have  we  suc- 
ceeded in  making  any  impression  on  the  anti-war  Socialists 
in  America?  Have  we  made  any  headway  among  German 
citizens  in  this  country?  On  the  contrary,  are  these  groups 
not  feverishly  busy  with  the  effort  to  make  the  American 
cause  unpopular,  to  defend  Germany  and  to  force  America 
to  an  immediate  or  German-made  peace? 

The  German  Socialists  are  still  on  the  offensive  in  Amer- 
ica. As  long  as  this  continues  to  be  the  case  it  is  evidently 
hopeless  to  initiate  an  American  peace  offensive  among  the 
German  Socialists  in  Germany.  We  must  wait  until  the  de- 
feat of  their  armies  gives  them  new  food  for  thought.  Then, 
no  doubt,  they  will  at  once  become  susceptible  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  a  just,  humane  and  democratic  peace,  as  laid  down 
by  the  President. 


VI.     The  Kaiser  and  the  Socialists 


What  has  the  Kaiser  to  do  with  the  Socialists? 

We  know  that  the  support  of  the  Socialists  inside  of  Ger- 
many was  regarded  as  very  valuable  and  that  there  was 
not  much  difficulty  in  obtaining  this  support.  But  what 
has  the  Kaiser  to  ask  for  and  what  can  he  hope  to  get 
from  the  Socialists  of  other  countries?  The  Kaiser  has 
two  things  to  ask  of  the  Socialists  of  Russia,  America,  Eng- 
land, France  and  Italy: 

1.  That  these  Socialists  support  him  in  his  demand  for 
peace  at  such  a  time  as  German  arms  have  attained  their 

.   maximum  possible   strength,   namely,   at   that  time   which 
Clausewitz,   the  greatest   of   all   German   military   experts, 
,  called  the  "moment  of  victory." 

2.  That  these  non-German  Socialists  should  create  the 
maximum  difficulties  for  their  governments,  for  example, 
by  asking  for  unattainable  economic  demands,  for  a  degree 
of  personal  freedom  impossible  in  war  time,  and,  above  all, 
by  anti-war  riots  and  rebellion  against  all  existing  govern- 
ments (outside  of  Germany). 

The  Kaiser's  program  for  Socialists  (outside  of  Ger- 
many) is  being  carried  out  almost  to  the  letter — at  least  by 
a  part  of  the  Socialists  in  all  the  Entente  countries.  It  is 
hardly  necessary  to  refer  to  Russia,  as  the  condition  in 
that  countrj'  can  be  noted  on  the  first  page  of  the  news- 
papers every  morning.  But  we  must  recall  that  the  So- 
cialist party  of  America  has  taken  almost  the  same  posi- 
tion as  the  Socialists  in  control  of  the  Russian  Council  of 
Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Delegates.  This  has  gone  so  far 
that  the  self-respecting  American  Socialists  and  genuine  in- 
ternationalists are  leaving  the  party  on  the  grounds  of  its 
support  of  the  Kaiser's  program.  John  Spargo,  one  of  the 
five  members  of  the  executive  committee  and  perhaps  the 
best  known  Socialist  author  in  America,  has  already  left. 
Allan  Benson,  the  candidate  for  the  Presidencv  last  fall, 
has  announced  that  he  will  leave  as  soon  as  the  party  ref- 
erendum  has  definitely  indorsed  the  action  of  the  recent 
*  party  convention  in  St.  Louis — which  many  Socialists  have 
denounced  as  outright  treason. 

In  France  the  party  is  divided  into  two  almost  equal 
halves,  one  faction  acting  along  the  above-mentioned  Rus- 
sian and  "American"  lines.  The  situation  in  England  is 
■  somewhat  better,  as  the  British  Labor  party,  an  organiza- 
tion recognized  as  Socialistic  by  the  international  Socialist 
organization,  is  pro-Ally ;  but  the  two  smaller  Socialist  parr 
ties  are  violently  in  favor  of  an  immediate  peace  on  the 


basis  of  "no  annexation,  no  indemnities,"  in  accord  with  the 
plans  of  the  German  chancellor  and  his  entourage. 

It  ought  not  to  be  necessary  to  explain  how  the  Kaiser 
has  achieved  this  result.  This  is  just  one  more  of  the 
astounding  successes  of  the  German  propaganda  such  as 
that  achieved  by  Bernstorff  in  the  United  States  and  that 
carried  on  by  the  German  agents  in  Russia  at  the  same 
time  in  the  court  of  the  Czar  and  among  the  anarchists. 
The  only  difference  is  that  a  special  machinery  existed  for 
the  purpose  of  winning  foreign  Socialists  for  the  Kaiser's 
use,  namely,  the  so-called  international  Socialist  movement. 
Just  as  the  German  government  exercised  a  vast  influence 
over  the  little  neighboring  countries  of  Europe  by  military 
and  economic  pressure,  so  the  German  Socialists  have  for 
years  dominated  nearly  all  the  Socialist  parties  of  Europe 
with  the  exception  of  those  of  France  and  Belgium.  When 
the  present  war  came  on,  here  was  an  ideal  machine  to  be 
used  for  the  Kaiser's  purposes — especially  as  the  German 
and  Russian  Jewish  Socialists  are  predominating  in  the 
United  States. 

In  order  to  accomplish  his  double  object,  however,  the 
Kaiser  needed  to  make  use  of  two  kinds  of  German  Social- 
ists. From  almost  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  German 
Socialists  have  preached  the  peace  terms  desired  by  the 
Kaiser,  namely,  "no  annexation,  no  indemnities,"  a  return 
to  the  status  quo  which  existed  before  the  war — allowing 
the  Kaiser  to  absorb  his  present  military  allies  and  com- 
pletely to  dominate  his  beaten  and  weakened  neighbors,  who 
would  have  obtained  no  compensating  advantage  out  of  the 
war.  All  factions  of  the  German  Socialists  also  favor  im- 
mediate peace,  "regardless  of  the  strategic  situation,"  which 
means  a  peace  resting  on  German  military  advantage,  that 
is  a  peace  on  the  Kaiser's  terms.  But  now  came  a  diffi.- 
culty.  It  was  necessary  to  gain  a  popular  support  for  this 
program  at  home  and  at  the  same  time  to  gain  popular 
support  for  it  abroad.  This  required  a  division  among  the 
German  Socialists.  The  pro-Kaiser  majority  is  used  for 
the  purpose  of  getting  support  at  home,  but  for  the  very 
reason  that  it  supports  the  Kaiser  it  is  useless  as  a  bait  to 
obtain  the  support  of  foreign  Socialists  for  the  Kaiser's 
program.  The  so-called  minority,  on  the  other  hand,  led 
by  the  famous  world-renowned  Socialists,  Haase,  Kautsky 
and  Bernstein,  opposes  the  government  in  domestic  affairs 
— though  by  entirely  legal  and  therefore  absolutely  harmless 
and  ineffective  methods.     However,  this  is  sufficient  oppo- 


13 


sition  to  satisfy  the  Germanophile  and  ultra-pacifist  foreign 
Socialists.  These  leaders  are,  therefore,  in  a  position  to 
obtain  a  favorable  hearing  for  the  Kaiser's  program  abroad. 
So  much  for  the  Kaiser's  first  object,  a  popular  support  of 
the  German  peace  terms  both  inside  of  Germany  and  by 
foreign  Socialists. 

His  second  object  is  to  promote  revolution  abroad  with- 
out promoting  revolution  at  home.  For  this  purpose  the 
minority  just  mentioned  is  not  satisfactory.  And  at  this 
point  the  Kaiser  is  saved  by  a  third  Socialist  group,  which 
he  has  done  nothing  to  favor,  namely,  the  revolutionists 
of  the  Liebknecht  faction,  most  of  whom  are  now  in 
jail. 

The  very  existence  of  a  group  of  revolutionists  in  Ger- 
many, such  as  that  led  by  Liebknecht,  Rosa  Luxemburg, 
Clara  Zetkin  and  others,  furnishes  sufficient  ground  for  the 
revolutionary  dogmatists  and  fanatics  of  Russia  and  other 
countries  to  believe,  or  to  claim  to  believe,  that  a  revolu- 
tion is  immediately  pending  in  Germany.  While  such 
an  idea  is  laughed  at  by  the  German  government  and  all 
well-informed  persons  in  Germany,  the  belief  that  a  Ger- 
man revolution  is  about  to  take  place  has  been  encouraged 
and  carefully  worked  up  in  all  other  countries  where  this 


particular  species  of  Socialism  is  strong — for  example,  in 
France,  Russia  and  the  United  States.  In  England,  on  the 
other  hand,  where  revolutionary  Socialism  is  very  weak  and 
pacifism  is  strong,  the  Germanophiles  have  laid  stress  upon 
the  idea  that  there  is  a  strong  democratic  peace  party  in  Ger- 
many. The  one  statement  is  as  untrue  as  the  other.  Although 
it  is  possible  that  a  protracted  series  of  severe  defeats  would 
ultimately  bring  Germany  to  a  revolution,  the  situation 
at  the  present  moment  is  sufficiently  indicated  by  the  fact 
that  practically  all  the  best-known  revolutionary  leaders  are 
either  in  jail  or  under  charges  of  high  treason  which  may 
put  them  in  jail  at  any  moment.  The  Socialist  majority 
faction  is  antirrevolutionary,  the  minority  advocates  purely 
legal  means  in  its  opposition  to  the  government,  and  the 
revolutionary  group  is  represented  only  by  two  or  three — 
or  at  the  most  half  a  dozen — of  the  110  Socialist  members 
of  the  Reichstag.  Pacifism  is  equally  weak  among  the 
German  Socialists.  All  three  of  the  factions  just  mentioned 
are  in  favor  of  a  German  peace  as  already  stated.  With 
the  possible  exception  of  the  small  revolutionary  group,  all 
would  be  glad  to  have  the  war  end  at  a  time  when  they 
are  fully  aware  that  the  Kaiser  has  every  advantage  in  the 
dictation  of  the  terms  of  peace. 


VII.     President  Wilson,  the  German  Government,  and  the 

German  People 


The  President's  peace  terms  declaration  of  January  8th 
has  once  more  brought  into  the  foreground  his  distinction 
between  the  German  government  and  the  German  people. 

Nothing  is  more  certain  in  this  war  than  that  the  atti- 
tude of  the  American  people  and  of  our  government  towards 
the  German  people  and  our  attitude  toward  the  German 
government  are  separate  and  distinct.  The  President  has 
lost  no  opportunity  to  voice  the  American  position  in  this 
matter.  In  all  his  addresses  since  the  beginning  of  the 
war  he  has  touched  upon  this  question.  But  he  has  only 
been  able  to  discuss  limited  phases  of  this  great  and  vitally 
important  subject  in  each  speech;  it  is  only  when  we  put 
all  of  his  references  to  the  German  people  together  that  we 
realize  that  he  has  made  wholly  an  accurate  and  highly 
satisfactory  statement  of  the  feeling  of  the  American  peo- 
ple toward  the  people  of  Germany. 


German  Government  and  German  People 

In  his  message  which  called  for  a  declaration  of  war 
against  Germany,  President  Wilson  spoke  of  the  German 
government  as  "an  autocracy  backed  by  organized  force 
which  is  controlled  wholly  by  its  will,  and  not  by  the  will 
of  its  people,"  that  it  "did  what  it  pleased  and  told  the 
people  nothing."   . . 

Since  this  great  address  the  President's  references  to  the 
character  of  the  German  people  have  been  frequent.  One 
quotation  from  his  Flag  Day  speech  (June  14),  will  be  suf- 
ficient to  define  our  position.  "The  war  was  begun  by  the 
military  masters  of  Germany,  who  proved  to  be  also  the 
masters  of  Austria-Hungary.  These  men  have  never  rer 
garded  nations  as  peoples,  men,  women  and  children  of 
like  blood  and  frame  as  themselves,  for  whom  governments 
existed  and  in  whom  governments  had  their  life.  They 
have  regarded  them  merely  as  serviceable  organizations 
which  they  could  by  force  or  intrigue  bend  or  corrupt  to 
their  own  purpose." 


IL 

The  Position  of  the  German  People 

The  President  has  carefully  and  repeatedly  stated  the 
tragic  position  of  the  German  people  as  we  Americans  see 
it.  He  has  said  that  this  people  did  not  originate,  choose, 
or  desire  this  hideous  war,  "or  wish  that  we  should  be 
drawn  into  it"  (June  14).  "It  was  not  upon  their  impulse 
that  their  government  acted  in  entering  the  war.  It  was 
not  with  their  previous  knowledge  or  approval"  (April  2). 

The  President  has  gone  out  of  his  way  to  pay  a  sincere 
tribute  to  the  sterling  qualities  of  the  German  people  as  then 
recognized  by  the  overwhelming  majority  of  Americans. 
In  his  address  to  the  American  Federation  of  Labor  at 
Buflfalo  (November  13) ),  he  said : 

"I  believe  that  the  spirit  of  freedom  can  get  into  the 
hearts  of  Germans  and  find  as  fine  a  welcome  there  as  it 
can  find  in  any  other  hearts,  but  the  spirit  of  freedom  does 
not  suit  the  plans  of  the  Pan-Germans." 

But  it  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  enter  into  the  virtues 
or  other  characteristics  of  the  German  people.  The  essen- 
tial question  involved  is  their  attitude  towards  the  people 
of  America.  The  President  has  stated  at  the  very  begin- 
ning of  the  war  that  we  did  not  believe  that  the  German 
people  cherished  towards  us  "any  hostile  feeling  or  pur- 
pose." 

III. 

The  Attitude  of  America  Towards  the  German  People 

Feeling  that  it  was  impossible  that  the  German  people 
apart  from  the  German  ruling  classes  can,  or  did,  harbor 
any  hostility  towards  America,  the  President  further  ex- 
pressed our  view  that  "we  are  not  the  enemies  of  the  Ger- 
man people  and  they  are  not  our  enemies"  (June  14). 

The  belief  is  almost  universal  in  this  country  that  "we 
are  fighting  their  cause  as  they  will  some  day  see  it,  as  well 
as  our  own"  (June  14). 

14 


In  the  opening  message  of  the  war  the  President  cate- 
gorically declared:  "We  have  no  quarrel  with  the  German 
people.  We  have  no  feeling  toward  them  but  one  of  sym- 
pathy and  friendship."  This  expression  met  with  the  prac- 
tically unanimous  approval  of  the  entire  American  people 
(April  2). 

In  his  Flag  Day  speech  (June  14),  the  President  de- 
clared :  "This  is  a  people's  war,  a  war  for  freedom  and 
justice  and  self-government  amongst  all  the  nations  of  the 
world,  a  war  to  make  the  world  safe  for  the  peoples  who 
live  upon  it  and  have  made  it  their  own,  the  German  people 
themselves  included." 

IV. 

Why  We  Are  at  Present  Compelled  to  Fight  Both  the 

German  Government  and  the  German  People 

In  his  reply  to  the  Pope  the  President  said,  "the  Ameri- 
can people  believe  that  peace  should  rest  upon  the  rights 
of  peoples,  not  the  rights  of  governments — the  rights  of 
peoples  great  or  small,  weak  or  powerful — their  equal  right 
to  freedom  and  security  and  self-government  and  to  a  par- 
ticipation upon  fair  terms  in  the  economic  opportunities 
of  the  world — the  German  people,  of  course  themselves  in- 
cluded if  they  will  accept  equality  and  not  seek  domina- 
tion." 

Here  it  is  important  to  note  that  we  can  offer  a  friendly 
relation  with  the  German  people  only  "if  they  will  accept 
equality  and  not  seek  domination."  In  other  words,  the 
German  people  have  not  yet  made  it  clear  that  they  are 
prepared  to  accept  equality  and  not  seek  domination.  As  the 
President  accurately  says  in  the  same  speech,  "we  must 
await  some  ne^v  evidence  of  the  purpose  of  the  great  peo- 
ples of  the  Central  Powers."  It  is  not  only  that  the  great 
peoples  of  the  Central  Powers  (Germany  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary) are  not  permitted  to  declare  their  real  opinion,  but 
v/e  have  no  ground  for  assuming  that  this  opinion  will  be 
either  favorable  to  our  offer  of  a  position  of  equality  among 
the  nations. 

"The  people  of  Germany  are  being  told  by  the  men  whom 
they  nozv  permit  to  deceive  them  and  to  act  as  their  mas- 
ters, that  they  are  fighting  for  the  very  life  and  existence 
of  their  empire,  a  war  of  desperate  self-defense  against 
deliberate  aggression."  Here  the  important  fact  to  note  is 
not  that  the  German  government  deceives  the  German  peo- 
ple and  acts  as  its  master,  but  that  the  German  people  "now 
permit"  this  mastery  and  deception     (Dec.  4). 

German  People  Satisfied  with  Campaign  of  Domination 

The  President  has  further  pointed  to  another  fact  of 
universal  knowledge  that  the  German  people  are  submitting 
with  "temporary  zest"  to  the  domination  of  the  present 
ruling  classes  (Aug.  27). 

It  is  evident  that  some  great  change  in  the  situation  will 
have  to  intervene  among  these  people  that  submit  with  a 
temporary  zest  to  men  whom  "they  permit  to  deceive  them 
and  act  as  their  masters."  The  President  and  the  Ameri- 
can people  have  a  perfectly  clear  idea  about  what  this 
great  change  will  probably  be,  namely,  the  defeat  of  the 
German  armies,  led  by  this  same  ruling  caste.  The  Presi- 
dent and  the  American  people  realize,  as  Mr.  Wilson  has 
repeatedly  and  explicitly  pointed  out,  that  if  the  German 
armies  are  victorious  the  zest  of  the  German  people  in  their 
Government  will  prove  lasting  and  may  even  become 
stronger  than  ever,  while  the  defeat  of  these  armies  is  bound, 
sooner  or  later,  to  have  the  opposite  effect.  The  President 
has  expressed  our  attitude  in  his  Flag  Day  address:   They 


have  but  one  chance  to  perpetuate  their  military  or  even 
their  controlling  political  influence.  If  they  can  secure 
peace  now,  with  the  immense  advantages  still  in  their  hands, 
which  they  have  up  to  this  point  apparently  gained,  they 
will  have  justified  themselves  before  the  German  people: 
they  will  have  gained  by  force  what  they  promised  to 
gain  by  it;  an  immense  expansion  of  German  industrial 
and  commercial  opportunities.  Their  prestige  will  be  se- 
cure and  with  their  prestige  political  power.  If  they  fail, 
their  people  will  thrust  them  aside:  a  government  account- 
able to  the  people  themselves  will  be  set  up  in  Germany 
as  it  has  been  in  England,  in  the  United  States,  in  France, 
and  in  all  the  great  countries  of  the  modern  time  except 
Germany." 

How  the  Germans  Will  Justify  Their  Kind  of  Warfare 

Here  it  is  vital  to  note  that  the  state  of  mind  of  the 
German  people  is  such  that  the  victory  of  Prussian  despotism 
will  in  their  mind  justify  it.  The  German  people  are  so 
hypnotized  by  the  past  and  recent  successes  of  the  Ger- 
man military  machine  that  thfey  do  not  realize  that  even  if 
Prussian  militarism  is  not  completely  overthrown,  if  the 
German  power  is  not  "crushed  and  utterly  brought  to  an 
end,"  this  "would  make  it  necessary  to  create  a  permanent 
hostile  combination  of  nations  against  the  German  people, 
who  are  its  instruments"  (Dec.  4). 

But  why  is  it  necessary  that  the  German  people  should 
undergo  months,  and  perhaps  years  of  additional  suffer- 
ing in  order  that  they  should  be  able  to  grasp  the  funda- 
mentals of  a  democratic  peace  based  on  genuine  interna- 
tionalism? Is  there  any  inborn  mental  or  moral  defect 
among  the  presenb-day  Germans  ?  By  no  means.  But  they 
are  soaked  and  permeated  by  the  Kaiser's  Kultur.  This  ex- 
planation was  eloquently  and  fully  expounded  by  Secre- 
tary of  War  Baker  (Dec.  29)  : 

Rulers   Dominate   Minds  of  the   German  People 

"We  find  that  the  forty  years  which  Germany  has  spent 
since  1870,  if  we  care  to  go  no  further  back  than  that,  of 
so-called  preparation  for  this  war  was  not  of  most  im- 
portance so  far  as  it  was  spent  in  the  preparation  of  armies 
or  in  the  training  of  men.  But  the  significance  of  the  process 
of  German  military  education  lies  in  this  thought — in  those 
forty  years,  with  what  was  back  of  it,  she  has  acquired  in 
a  governing  class  a  complete  domination  over  the  minds  of 
her  people,  so  that  at  the  command  of  an  autocrat  prin- 
ciples of  morality  can  be  blotted  out  of  the  imagination 
and  the  ordinary  dictates  of  friendship,  kindness,  sympathy 
and  justice  can  be  made  to  be  forgotten. 

"Think  of  the  state  of  the  minds  of  the  people  in  which 
this  is  possible. 

"To  me  the  tragedy  of  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania  is  not 
the  whita-robed  babes  and  women,  Americans  though  they 
were,  whose  bones  are  now  under  the  English  Channel.  The 
tragedy  is  not  that  loss  of  life,  sad  as  that  -is  and  always 
will  be,  but  the  tragedy  of  this  great  event  was  the  approval 
of  it  by  the  conscience  of  the  German  people." 

It  is  evident  that  the  psychology  of  a  people  that  ap- 
proves the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania  and  similar  junker 
atrocities  will  have  to  undergo  a  revolutionary  change  be- 
fore it  is  likely  to  accept  the  peace  terms  of  America  and 
the  democratic  nations.  We  know  that  the  junker  psy- 
chology will  not  alter,  we  must  fight  until  the  psychology 
of  the  German  people  ceases  to  be  what  it  has  been  for  the 
past  fifty  years — a  change  that  can  hardly  be  brought  about 
in  a  day. 


/:'<• 


*>  "^■... 


N 


jaylord  Bros. 

Makers 
Syracuse,  N.  V. 
J         P4I,  JAN.  21, 1909 


373757 


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